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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
WASHINGTON'S FISCAL CRISIS
ALFRED E. HARSCH*
GEORGE A. SHIPMAN**
I
The State of Washington today is critically hampered in the financ-
ing of its government at all levels by a fiscal straitjacket that has
been materializing over a period of nearly thirty years. Legal and
financial expedients of the last decade signify its increasing pressure.
Government so confined obviously cannot respond to basic social
and economic changes, and many such changes are observed in
Washington. Dramatic increases in population, the trend toward in-
creased industrialization, growing urbanization throughout the state,
the development in the Puget Sound area of one of the nation's major
urban complexes with accompanying expansion of the role of govern-
mental services in the life of the regional culture, all cumulate and
interact.' Meanwhile, the state's legal and administrative mechanisms
for drawing upon economic capacity no longer suffice to underwrite
needed governmental services. The aim of this paper is to sketch the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
** Professor of Political Science, University of Washington.
I These trends and their proportions are familiar. It is worth noting, however,
that the State of Washington grew 37% in population during the decade 1940-1950.
Since 1950 the growth rate has slowed substantially. But the impact upon govern-
mental services of the growth that was concentrated in that decade is significant.
Population density (1950) was estimated at more than twice that of other Pacific
Northwest states. In that same year, Washington's percentage of urban population
was at the national average. Notable also was the 1950 census disclosure that 54% of
the population of the state had been born in some other state or in a foreign country,
more than twice the national average. These data are cited in PACIFIc NORTHWEST
ASSEMBLY, THE STATES IN THE PACIFIC NoRTHWEST 7 (1957). A working paper sub-
mitted to the Washington State Tax Advisory Council by James K. Hall, Professor
of Economics, University of Washington, cites these growth rates, 1930-1957: Aggre-
gate personal income 417%; per capita personal income 203%; tax revenues 1034%.
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scope and nature of the current problem, to explore the legal rigidities
that dominate it, and to suggest the apparent steps prerequisite to
realistic, durable and workable solutions.'
There are many indications of the dimensions of the problem. The
general fund of the state treasury, the fund used to finance the major
proportion of general services rendered by the state government, is
seriously overdrawn. Careful analysis of its apparent condition, and
a projection to the end of the current biennium, show the probability
of an accumulated overdraft of between 80 and 100 million dollars.'
The likelihood is that this overdraft can be financed for the im-
mediate future, as it has been in the recent past, by interfund loans
and advances from other funds and accounts in the treasury.4 But
this practice cannot continue indefinitely. Unless corrective action is
taken, the condition of the fund will grow progressively worse and
more difficult to correct. The point is that the state has not in recent
years, is not now, and cannot in the foreseeable future, support ex-
penditure commitments from the authorized revenues of the fund.
Past efforts to avoid inevitable charges by postponement have made
showings of improvement, but such showings were temporary.' There
is no avoiding responses to the social and economic forces that control
the scope and volume of public services. Needs postponed, whether
2 At the writing of these comments, the Washington State Tax Advisory Council,
established by the Legislature (Wash. Laws 1957 c. 291; RCW 43.38) is engaged in
a comprehensive review of the problems of financing state and local government in
Washington. Much of the material used here was prepared for the use of the Council
and is contained in various working papers which will be cited. These were made
available to the authors and were used through the courtesy of the Council.
3 The general fund consists of a general, or generally available account, and more
than thirty special, or dedicated, accounts. However, the balances of the fund as a
whole are available for authorized expenditures from the fund. The special accounts
were added to the fund in 1955 and 1957. RCW 43.79. The current overdraft is in
the general account; balances in the special accounts are sufficient to show a cash
balance for the fund as a whole without, however, taking contingent liabilities into
consideration. The estimate of overdraft at the end of the biennium is for the general
account.
4 WASHINGTON STATE TREASURER, MONTHLY REPORT 142-43 (June, 1958), reports,
as of the close of business June 30, 1958, a consolidated gross cash balance of $102.4
million, of which $82.7 million is held in current investments. This balance, of course,
does not take into account items in transit. Interfund loans and advances are author-
ized by RCW 43.84.100.
5 For example, the overdraft at the end of the 1949-1951 biennium of $44.1 million
was reduced slightly to $43.6 million by the end of the 1951-1953 biennium. During the
next period, 1953-55, the "deficit" increased to $58.1 million and then declined at the
end of the 1955-1957 biennium to $29.3 million. General fund appropriations for the
1957-1959 period exceed originally estimated revenues by some $33 million. Because
of general economic conditions, it is improbable that the original revenue estimate
will be realized. A "loss" of $20 million is a reasonable estimate. Meanwhile expendi-
ture requirements respond to population, price levels and economic conditions. "Reces-
sion" conditions, for example, could easily produce an appropriation deficiency of $20
million in public assistance.
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for more adequate services or for the capital plant to house them,
simply accumulate to become all the more urgent and perplexing.
Inattention or wishful thinking will not turn back the clock to a more
comfortable, less puzzling set of issues. Nor will these problems
solve themselves. The central issues must be faced.6
Local government problems are counterparts to the state's, and in
a genuine sense they are state problems as well. The cities report
current deficiencies, after pushing legally available revenue sources
to the practical limit, of a conservative twenty-five million dollars a
year exclusive of capital outlay. High crime rates reflect serious
undermanning of police protection. Underwriters' surveys in a
number of communities have resulted in higher fire insurance rates
due to the need for improved fire protection.
The counties of the state report need for an over-all increase of
five per cent in their general revenue. This does not include the
increase in statutory compensation of elective county officials that
will occur in 1959 and is estimated to produce, over-all, an additional
million dollars in annual expenditures. Nor does it consider the
operating deficits that have accumulated in twelve counties. 7  The
problems of the school districts can also be regarded as state govern-
ment concerns. For all practical purposes, the state revenue system
underwrites whatever costs the school districts are unable to meet,
when the items involved are regarded as justified educational costs.8
Precise financial statistics of revenue, expenditure and debt for the
state and its subdivisions as a whole are hard to come by. Those
available provide, at best, no more than a shaky basis for interpreta-
tions and evaluations. The reasons for this obscurity are far too
numerous and too complex to explain in detail here. The fact remains
that literally no one is now in a position to know definitely the present
financial condition of the state's governments, or to determine the
total amount expended for public services from taxes, special revenues,
service charges, local fund income and a variety of other sources.
However, there is no conclusive evidence that the people of the
state of Washington, as compared with other states with similar
personal income and public service levels, are making disproportionate
6 This is discussed in Suncos!TrrrE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, WASH.
STATE TAX ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT TO THE TAX ADVISORY COUNCL., 8-12 (May,
1958) ; Id. Appendix II, items 5, 6.
7 Id. at 13-18; Id. Appendix III, items 2, 4.
8 This is done by legislative appropriation for the support of common schools. Funds
are distributed under a complex formula. RCW 28.41.
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payments toward the support of state and local government? On the
other hand, it can be said with all emphasis that the legal framework
within which the governmental fiscal system must operate makes a
flexible and realistic financing of government next to impossible.
The difficulties and awkwardness of the present system will intensify
in the years ahead. The need for greater flexibility is underlined by
a ten-year projection, indicating that the need for services, assuming
the present quality level, will probably grow at two and a half times
the rate of growth of the yield of the present revenue system." The
basis for this estimate was the state's general fund and related opera-
tions, particularly those involved in the financing of the common
schools. The reasons for the ten-year trend are found in the more
rapid growth of the school age and over-65 age groups in the popula-
tion than of the income-producing age groups. The growth of the
yield of the present revenue system will fall far behind the increase in
service requirements. The estimated result, assuming no change in
the revenue system, and no change in the scope and quality of
services rendered, would be a general fund overdraft for the 1967-1969
biennium of some 300 million dollars. This does not include any
accumulations of overdrafts for previous fiscal periods." Projections
of this sort are always open to debate because, if they are to be made
at all, they involve some choice of population and income assumptions
and one or another method of estimating. 2 However, it does seem
9 The following are taken from a working memorandum, Comparative Statistics on
Tax Collections of State and Local Governments, prepared by Professor Hall for the
Tax Advisory Council. They are for 1953, the last year for which state and local
government data are available. State and local tax collections as a percentage of per-
sonal income received in the state were estimated at 7.9%, as compared with a 48-state
average of 7.4%. Other states were California 8.2%, Oregon 82%, Idaho 9.2%,
Minnesota 9.1%, Iowa 9.4%, and Wisconsin 8.7%. Washington was twenty-sixth or
about the median in the ranking of all the states.
10 This projection was prepared for the Tax Advisory Council by Philip Cartwright,
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Washington, and was summarized by
him at a panel discussion at the Institute of Government, University of Washington,
July 7, 1958.
11 In this projection, estimates were made for the biennium 1967-1969 only. On this
basis a difference of $325 million appeared between estimated revenue yields and esti-
mated appropriation requirements. Under the same assumptions, intervening bien-
niums would also show overdrafts of increasing proportions, which could not be
liquidated within the present revenue of the general fund. These overdrafts would
accumulate to some amount, for those purposes not estimated, which would be out-
standing at the beginning of the 1967-1969 biennium. The $325 million estimated for
that biennium therefore would be added to the total already accumulated.
l2Significant assumptions were: Population, no net in-migration; industrial
employment, no industrial growth in the next decade comparable to that of the air-
craft industry in the last decade; no major depression; services and service cost, a
fairly constant level of service quality, rendered to more people (particularly in the
school-age and over-65 age groups) at higher costs reflecting a general increase in
the costs of personal services and construction throughout the economy.
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beyond question that state and local government, over the next
decade, will be drawing a larger proportion of individual income.
Only the size of this larger proportion is a matter for speculation.
The general fund projection, of course, does not take several other
areas of governmental activity into account. There is the matter of
highways, for example. No ten-year estimate of requirements is at
hand. Nevertheless, all indications are that highway revenues will
have to be increased in rate to support not only the back-log of
needed construction, but to keep pace with future increases in traffic
density. As for local government needs, they can be expected to
grow at least at a rate approximating that projected for the state
general fund. Increasing density of population in the urban and
growing "exurban" areas will mean more service requirements and
higher service costs. Some of this increase can be handled on a non-
tax, or service charge, basis. But the cost will be there nonetheless. 3
Altogether, the probability is strong that, of the estimated income
ieceived by individuals in the state, the eight to eight-and-one-half
per cent now paid in state and local taxes could increase over the next
decade to twelve per cent. This statement needs a number of qualifi-
cations because it assumes a given rate of increase in service costs
against a much lower rate of increase in personal income in the
state. Nevertheless, it poses an urgent question: In view of the
probability that a larger proportion of income received by individuals
will be applied to the support of state and local services over the next
decade, what changes in the legal framework for state and local gov-
ernment are needed to permit sound and workable readjustments?
In passing, it should be noted that this prospect is not unique to the
state of Washington. It is nation-wide. " Since World War II state and
local expenditures have risen at a much higher rate than those of the
federal government. So also has bonded debt. The Tax Foundation's
projections for the nation as a whole are quite consistent with those
13 Cities in Washington make wide use of the fee for service for the support of such
services as water, sewer, garbage, and refuse disposal and the like. See RCW 35.21.
130-.150 (garbage collection and disposal) ; RCW 35.67.190 (sewers). Closely related,
of course, is the special assessment method for financing capital improvements fre-
quently employed through the local improvement districts. RCW 35.43.040.
14 TAX FOUNDATION, INC., PROJECT NOTE No. 43; THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGE TO
THE STATES 10 (March 1958). Heller, Financing State-Local Government in an Age
of Expansion, State Government, June, 1957, p. 140. Professor Heller cites the follow-
ing indices of growth for state-local changes and for federal changes: State-Local
(1946-1956), revenues 250, expenditures 324, gross debt 306; Federal (1947-1957),
cash receipts 188, cash expenditures 212, gross debt 105. Id. at 141.
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for Washington. Other estimates support the anticipated trend."
The Tax Foundation reports many states engaged in analyses of
their revenue systems."6 Washington's problem with respect to basic
social and economic trends is only a part of a nation-wide concern. In
the legal and fiscal aspects of the problem, however, Washington
stands apart.
The rather different situation in Washington has a background.
Prior to 1930, the state was a property tax state. Governmental
services were for the most part underwritten by levies upon property."
The adoption of the "forty-mill" limitation policy, first by initiative
and later by a constitutional amendment, forced a shift to other sources
of revenue.'8 The state became in effect an excise tax state, relying
more heavily upon this form of taxation than any other. For all
practical purposes, the property tax has been abandoned as a source
of state government support.' At the same time, the levying capacity
of local government upon property was frozen by levy limitations.
But the assessment level, while constitutionally defined as fifty per
cent of actual value, was left open to erratic and so far uncontrollable
15 TAx FOUNDATION, op. cit. supra note 14, at 31. A ten-year projection in 1955 by
the Tax Foundation anticipated a possible 1965 level of state-local expenditures about
two thirds over the 1953 level. However, in the three years 1953-1956, the expenditures
level rose by almost half of the projected increase to 1965. Heller, op. cit. supra note
14, at 141, remarks that it would seem reasonable to expect a state-local total of
expenditures for all states of at least 60 billion dollars by 1965. While this would be a
100% increase over 1953, it would be only a 50% increase over 1956. This rate may
prove an underestimate, since the increase 1946-1956 was more than 200 per cent. It
may be estimated that, nationwide, this trend would leave a gap of from $9 to $10
billion to be filled in 1965. If this gap were to grow at an even rate, this would mean
a $1 billion increase in taxes a year over the period 1956-1965.
7 6 TAX FOUNDATION op. cit. supra note 14 at 20. Thirty-one studies were author-
ized in 1955 alone in twenty-seven states. From January. 1954, to December, 1956,
reports were issued by fifty state tax study groups. Thirteen additional ones were
issued in 1957.
37 John F. Sly, Professor of Politics, Princeton University, cites the trend in his
Property Taxes in the State of Washington, WAsH. STATE RESEARCH COUNCIL POCKET
REPORT SERIES 15 (1958). The property tax as a percentage of all state and local taxes
in Washington was: 1931, 80%; 1936, 46%; 1941, 32%; 1955, 28%.
18 The limitation was Initiative 64 adopted in 1932. Re-enactments occurred in suc-
cessive bienniums until the adoption of amendment 17 to the constitution in 1944. See
note 179 infra.
19 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. or COMMERCE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE GOV-
ERNMENT FINANCES IN 1957, 52 (1958), table 38, "Per capita amounts of selected
financial items, by states; 1957" lists the following per capita collections of general
sales or gross receipts taxes by states: Washington, $74 per capita the highest state
against a forty-eight-state average of $20.27; next in order, West Virginia, $68.44;
California, $44.79; New Mexico, $43.44; and Michigan, $43.38. The two-mill levy now
used for state purposes was until recently a county levy allocated to general public
assistance purpose. Both the support of recipients and the two-mill levy were trans-
ferred to the state. This move increased the yield of the tax and simplified financing
by making proceeds available throughout the state rather than in the county of collec-
tion only. RCW 74.04.150-.151.
[AUTUMN
WASHINGTON'S FISCAL CRISIS
variations." As a result, the locally administered services that could
not be supported from the available property tax levies had to be
maintained from service charges or from locally imposed excise taxes.
The latter, of course, were limited in application and rate, both by
practical considerations and by the use of excises on the part of the
state.2 Basic services increasingly become a state responsibility. In
time, all public assistance was assumed by the state government as
a directly administered and financed state service. Roads and high-
ways became a charge against special highway revenues;. the local
road system became, for the most part, a secondary state highway
system, and while county administered, was largely supported by
distributions of state-collected taxes. Public education was progres-
sively recognized as primarily a responsibility of the state. Public
education costs that could not be met from the limited school district
levies became a charge upon the state treasury. The result is that
the state of Washington, in 1953, showed state taxes as 69 per cent
of the total of state and local taxes in the state, as compared with a
national average of 50.5 per cent. The Washington proportion
appears to be the highest of any of the higher income states.2
It was noted earlier that the state is attempting to operate within
an extraordinarily rigid legal and fiscal framework. The framework
itself is familiar; its principal dimensions apply to any governmental
jurisdiction. At the outset, of course, there is the allocation of
service responsibilities between the state and its political subdivisions.
The assumed objective is to lodge in local government the responsi-
bility for those activities that are governed primarily by local needs,
that require local policy control, that fall within local administrative
capacity, and that can be supported by local fiscal capacity. State
services are regarded as reflecting the other side of the coin. They
are governed primarily by state-wide needs, they require uniform
state-wide policy control, they necessitate administrative methods
0 For discussions of efforts to control the local assessment level, infra at 269-274. For
the results of a state-wide survey of variations, SUBCOMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND
TAXATION, WASH. STATE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1953-1955 BIENNIUM, A STUDY OF
REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1954).
21 A catalogue of potential revenue sources for local government with an identifica-
tion of those legally pre-empted by the state and those pre-empted for all practical
purposes by rate levels is contained in SUBCOMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
op cit. supra note 6, Appendix I, item 5.
22 Statistics for the United States and for the Pacific Northwest states are in
PACIFIC NORTHWEST ASSEMBLY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 9, table 6. Data for 1953
showed the percentage distribution of revenue collection for Washington as state,
68.7% and local 31.3%. The percentages after distribution to the level administering
services were state, 40% and local, 60%.
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beyond the scope of the local units, and they require a broad base of
fiscal support. An intermediate variety of services consists of such
activities as the mandatory support of essentially state services by the
counties, and the local administration, with partial state financing, of
some services that are mixed state and local." Generally, each service
level needs to have the considerations mentioned above substantially
in balance, and it needs the types of institutions and operating mech-
anisms that can administer its service responsibilities effectively.
Next, each service level needs the administrative and managerial
means to assure well-coordinated, productive service operations. This
involves capacity to plan, budget, and coordinate and control related
governmental operations so that operating effectiveness can be realized.
The capacity depends upon a form of organization that makes
management possible; the avoidance of essentially independent, self-
sufficient activities within the structure becomes highly important.
Also important is the legal authority to employ such appropriate
managerial methods as budgeting, accounting, operating controls and
the like. Related to this is the capacity to develop a competent staff
of administrators and employees to perform operating activities.
A third category of considerations is in the area of fiscal methods.
Governmental jurisdictions, if they are to operate effectively, need
to be able to use their fiscal resources as a whole in a flexible, well-
planned way. The practice of breaking up total fiscal capacity into
a variety of dedicated or earmarked sources of revenue, each
assigned to some favored service, results in inbalance and inflexibility.
Some services arb well-supported; they may have more income than
they need. Others are "poor relations"; whatever the need, the
income is always short. These relationships are frozen into the
treasury structure by the pattern of revenue dedications. No room
is left for managerial flexibility. Another restrictive arrangement
seen in Washington is that of conducting operations on a special or
"local" fund basis in a way that does not involve appropriations,
general operating coordination nor even the processing of transactions
through the treasury." Such practices inevitably stunt the develop-
23 Familiar examples of essentially state services administered at the county level
are elections, certain public record functions such as land records, and courts of record.
Mixed services include the common schools and local highways.
24 Most of these seem to have at least general statutory authorization. The largest
of them use the funds of the State Liquor Commission, RCW 43.66.060-.070, and those
connected with the administration of unemployment compensation by the Department
of Employment Security, RCW 50.16. For another type of activity, see the State
Apple Advertising Commission, RCW 15.24.
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ment of the quality of public management that present day govern-
ment requires.
Fourth, and most frequently considered, is the matter of the reve-
nue system, the scheme by which the cost of governmental operations
is charged back to the income-producing capacity of the state. What
is important here is that legislative bodies at each level have the
breadth of judgment, the policy-making capacity, to distribute govern-
mental costs over the available tax base in the manner that public
attitudes regard as most equitable and most conducive to economic
well-being. The point is put in these terms because, whatever the
several groups in the society regard as desirable or undesirable about
a tax structure, their varying attitudes and values will, in the long
run, come to some equilibrium, an acceptable working formula which
reflects a balance among competing pressures. The important consid-
eration is that this competition of alternatives be permitted to work in
a flexible way, and that choices be broad enough that the working
formula can embrace as large a variety of balancing factors as may
be necessary to reach negotiated agreement. The democratic process
should be permitted to function.
Attention now turns to the question of the constitutional and related
legal limitations, if any, that make intelligent adjustments to changing
conditions difficult. What is emphasized here is the availability of
the legal capacity to exercise choice-to respond to changing condi-
tions intelligently. No emphasis will be put upon policies, either
those now pursued or those that in the future might be deemed
desirable.
With respect to the allocation of service responsibilities, the state
seems to be relatively free from serious difficulties. To be sure,
the constitution appears to contemplate that the state shall not assess
taxes for local purposes, and that it shall not support purely local
services." But no real difficulty need arise over these provisions
so long as revenue-raising capacities are broad enough in local govern-
ment to cover the administrative responsibilities assigned by the
legislature. Provisions of this sort rarely cause rigidity in themselves.
They can cause difficulty when other provisions, usually relating to
taxation, channel unusual pressure in their direction.26
2r WASH. CONsT., art. XI, § 12. See the discussion infra at 262-269.
26 States that have resorted to rigid limitations upon the yield of the local property
tax have encountered constitutional difficulties in the replacement of the revenue loss
for the support of purely local services. When locally available revenues are sharply
reduced, some services, such as roads and public welfare, can be moved to the state
1958]
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The constitution does place limitations upon capacity to revise
the organization of local government.' The alteration of county
boundaries raises special questions." The need for such alteration
has not arisen in sharp and acute form, but it may well do so. In time,
urban areas will spill across county lines, leaving the need for a con-
solidated form of city government in an area located in at least two
counties. The time is approaching when the organization of county
government will need reconstruction. In Washington, as elsewhere
in the nation, the function of the county seems to be changing from
the exercise of delegated state functions over an essentially rural area,
to the assumption of local service responsibilities, possibly in a
proprietary capacity, on behalf of urban clusters of population that
are either too small to operate efficiently as cities or which do not
require the full range of municipal activities." The reconstruction
of the county seems to be the indicated solution for the present pro-
fusion, and confusion, of overlapping special and "junior" taxing
districts in many parts of the state. State constitutional provisions,
therefore, should be revised to clear the way for such a development.
Even more serious are the constitutional prescriptions regarding the
organization of state government which impose insuperable burdens
upon state management. These will be commented upon below.
Under contemporary conditions state and local government is
big business. Its operations are large, complex and often technical
enough to discourage the interest of all but the most persistent. The
comfortable assumption seems to be that somehow the requirements
level. Others can be regarded as delegated state services, or mixed state-local services
such as schools and can be substantially supported by state grants. However, purely
local services, for example the types that are rendered in incorporated areas only, are
more difficult to justify as state responsibilities. When state-imposed taxes are used
for their support, taxpayers who have no access to the benefits are required to share in
financial support. On occasion, the argument has been pressed in state legislatures that
state-wide taxation to support services rendered only in incorporated areas are not
taxes for a public purpose so far as taxpayers in unincorporated areas are concerned.
27 WASH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 5, specifies county officials who shall be popularly
elected. Amendment 21 authorizing county home rule charters provides that the
charter shall not affect the election of prosecuting attorneys, the county superintendent
of schools and judicial officers.
28 WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 28, prohibits the enactment of any special law changing
county lines. Article XI, § 3, provides for the creation of new counties and probably
for the alteration of county lines, under provisions of general law. The only statutory
provision relating to a change in county lines, RCW 36.08 (originally enacted in 1891),
is limited in application to the transfer of territory where a city's harbor lies in two
counties. The definition of applicability is so specific with respect to territorial char-
acteristics as to make this provision for all practical purposes a special, rather than a
general law.
29 California and Utah have enacted interesting county service areas laws. WEsT's
ANN. CAL. CODES 25210.1-.90; Utah Sess. Laws 1957 c. 28, at 62.
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that are readily accepted for the administration of other large-scale
organizations do not apply to the state. There seems to be little
public concern over the fact that the state of Washington cannot be
managed."' The reasons for this situation are many; some derive
from the constitution. These deserve identification and explanation.
Basic to all other considerations is the fact that Washington is a
"long ballot" state. The executive branch, unlike that of the national
government, consists of a variety of separately-elected state officers.3'
Among them the governor has only such stature as he can win for
himself. He is not the head of the executive branch.32  Often state
officials are not candidates of the same political party. The beginning
of this difficulty is in the constitutional provision that establishes these
multiple offices. An administrative reorganization that placed respon-
sibilities where functionally they belong would assign several of the
officers to subordinate positions within larger operating agencies." In
other instances elective officials direct operating programs that should
be integrated with the rest of the state government. 4 These elective
30 See the discussion in SUBCOMMITnEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, Op. Cit.
supra note 6, at 22 ff. and Appendix I.
33 WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1. The legislature is authorized to abolish the offices of
lieutenant-governor, auditor and commissioner of public lands (§ 25). The office of
insurance commissioner is statutory (RCW 43.13).
32 WAsH. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides that the supreme executive power of the
state is vested in the governor. Section 5 provides that the governor may require
information in writing from the offices of the state on matters relating to their duties
and shall see that the laws are faithfully executed. But these provisions have little
practical meaning. The governor cannot discipline an elective state officer. His power
of removal does not extend beyond officers appointed by him and not subject to
impeachment. RCW 43.06.070. In the administration of the budget, appropriations
made to elective state officers are not subject to executive expenditure control, RCW
43.87.010. The assumption is that these officers are directly responsible to the people,
not to the governor.
33 Under contemporary conditions, the treasury operation is regarded as a sub-
sidiary and essentially ministerial aspect of fiscal management. This larger concern
is, in turn, only one side of the total management of state government, which needs to
be integrated into the governor's authority and responsibility for the administrative
operations of the state. The popular election of the treasurer is now an administrative
anachronism. The office of secretary of state is almost wholly ministerial. In the
state government the directors of the "code" departments exercise much more
important policy responsibility. See the comment by Professor Paul Beckett of Wash-
ington State College in PACIFIC NORTHWEST ASSEMBLY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29;
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, REORGANIZING STATE GOVERNMENT, 107 ff. (1950).
34 The two programs that most clearly need operating coordination with the rest of
the state government and which are headed by elected officials are natural resources
and insurance regulation. In both instances, however, the elective offices could be
abolished by the legislature. Note 31 stpra. Because of the growing importance of
public education as a state-directed, if not wholly state-administered, program and
because of the proportion of the total state budget it represents, there are impressive
reasons for drawing this function into a much closer administrative relationship with
the executive branch. In any case, the elective superintendent of public instruction is
regarded as obsolete. See for example STRAYER, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN WASHINGTON
1 (1946).
19581
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
officials are regarded, and they regard themselves, as directly respon-
sible to the electorate of the state. Appropriations made to their
agencies are immune from general administrative control. No one is
in a position to supervise their actions, to coordinate their operations,
or to assure that sound administrative practices are followed. Where
they are members of ex-officio bodies, some of which exercise important
responsibilities, there is no administrative accountability for their
action, and no way of enforcing it. 6 Here is a point of constitutional
obsolescence.
With respect to appropriations, article 8, section 4, of the state
constitution has an effect that probably was never contemplated. It
provides that no monies shall be paid from the treasury or any of
its funds except in accordance with an appropriation which shall
specify the sum and the object. Payments shall be made from appro-
priations within one month following the end of the next ensuing
fiscal biennium. This provision has had two consequences that seriously
impair the executive's capacity to manage the state's affairs. First,
its rigidity makes the use of revolving and special income funds ex-
tremely difficult. Thus the practice has developed of holding these
funds outside the treasury, immune both from the state's accounting
system and from executive supervision of their use. Nor are the
funds subject to appropriation or any regular legislative review.
Estimated transactions of these "local" funds for the current biennium
exceed 500 million dollars. There is no central record of their
working balances.3 7 Another consequence of this provision is the
36 A partial list of agencies composed in whole or in part of elective officials acting
ex officio includes the State Canvassing Board, RCW 29.62.100; State Employees
Retirement Board, RCW 41.40.030; State Finance Committee, RCW 43.33.010; Voting
Machine Committee, RCW 43.35.010; State Capitol Committee, RCW 43.34.010; Toll
Bridge Authority, RCW 47.56.020; Board of Natural Resources, RCW 43.30.40; and
Law Library Committee, RCW 43.36.010.
87 There is no statutory requirement that the status and transactions of these funds
be reported either to the auditor or the director of the budget. The estimate referred
to was developed by the office of the budget and was made available to the revenue
administration subcommittee of the Tax Advisory Council. These cases indicate some
of the differences that can occur in the treatment of various funds. In Washington Toll
Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 195 Wash. 636, 82 P.2d 120 (1938), it was held that the
legislature had directed that the funds available for the building of the Narrows
Bridge, consisting of the proceeds of the sale of revenue bonds, a federal grant and a
Pierce County contribution, were to be held by the treasurer as "not a state fuqd" and
consequently could be disbursed to pay proper charges without a specific appropriation.
However, it would seem that these monies were at least funds under treasury manage-
ment within the meaning of art. VIII, § 4. In its decision the court appears to have
made a distinction (646-49) between non-tax receipts, which need not be paid into the
treasury, and "taxes," which art. VII, § 6, requires shall be paid into the treasury.
However in Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465, 32 P.2d 560 (1934), the court had pre-
viously held that license fees collected in connection with the control of alcoholic bever-
ages were not taxes levied and collected for state purposes and might be paid into a
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convention that the legislature is precluded from authorizing the
governor to transfer sums among appropriation items to obtain maxi-
mum effectiveness in the use of funds.8  As a result, interrelated
appropriations may prove to be too low in some instances and too
high in others. The governor cannot be authorized to equalize them
in the light of operating experience. When the next legislature meets,
the short appropriations require special deficiency supplementation.
To avoid such developments, the legislature is inclined to set some
appropriations at levels that should avoid all difficulties, and to em-
ploy contingent item appropriations for use if need be.39 The result
is to increase the total of appropriations to a fictitious level. The
entire practice is an expedient to avoid the assumed effect of article 8,
section 4.
On balance, then, there is little scope for executive management in
revolving fund, relying upon State v. Sheppard 79 Wash. 328, 140 Pac. 332 (1914).
Subsequently in 1941 in Ernst v. Hingeley, 11 Wn2d 171, 118 P.2d 795 it was held that
art. VII, § 6, refers to property taxes and consequently the fact that unemployment
compensation payroll collections are not paid into the treasury does not preclude the as-
sumption that they are taxes. Up to this point there was some basis for assuming that
a dedicated revenue might be technically outside of the treasury although in the hands
of the treasurer as custodian. However, the position of two of the members of the
court in Clark v. Seiber, 48 Wn2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956), should be noted in this
connection. They were of the opinion that art. VII, § 6, would require that the pro-
ceeds of a property tax levied upon state-equalized assessments for common school sup-
port should be paid into the state treasury.
Two other cases suggest that the intent of the legislature rather than the nature of
the funds controls the application of article VIII, sec. 4. In Mason-Walsh-Atkinson-
Kier Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries, 5 Wn.2d 508, 105 P.2d 832 (1940),
the court considered whether a refund of industrial accident contributions, claimed to
have been improperly assessed, could be refunded without a legislative appropriation.
It was held that since the legislature had provided that accident fund receipts be paid
into the treasury, and since appropriations from the fund failed to specify the payment
of refunds, a disbursement could not be made. On the other hand, in State Em-
ployees Retirement Bd. v. Yelle, 31 Wn2d 87, 195 P.2d 646, modified on rehear-
ing, 201 P.2d 172 (1948), the question was whether refunds of contributions to em-
ployees leaving the state service could be made without a specific appropriation. In this
instance the legislature had directed that such refunds be paid from a specific fund.
It was held that, although the treasurer was the custodian of the fund, he acted as a
member of the retirement board and not in his constitutional capacity. The proceeds
of the system were not state funds but the property of members of the retirement
system. Hence, by legislative direction they may be disbursed for authorized purposes
without a specific appropriation.
These complexities argue convincingly for the amendment of art. VII, § 6, and art.
VIII, § 4, to permit publicly held and administered accumulations of monies to be
handled on a consistent and orderly basis.
38 It does not appear that any case has been decided by the state courts upon this
point. However, in the preparation of the state budget, and in making appropriations,
the convention referred to is accepted as required by art. VIII, § 4.
9 A good example is the use of the contingent receipts fund, RCW 43.79.250, as a
treasury receptacle for the receipt of unanticipated federal aid and for the allocation
of such receipts for the purposes for which granted. The amount is not high enough
to cover all possibilities. Also, it should be noted that a major purpose of the gov-
ernor's contingent fund is to surmount the difficulties caused by an inability to transfer
among appropriations.
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the state because of the meaning attributed to the status of the in-
dependently elected officials, the constitutional provision relating to
appropriation, and other influences and conventions. With respect
to the general fund, this point is worth remembering. Constitutional
exemptions and a variety of statutory exclusions, some legally neces-
sary for educational, trust and public assistance grant purposes, place
an estimated 535 million dollars of the 690 million dollars of appro-
priations made from the general fund outside the governor's control.4
Practical considerations, such as the unavoidable necessity of feeding
and housing patients in state institutions, reduce the governor's actual
control to less than 100 million dollars, or less than 15 per cent, of
the amount appropriated.
In the area of fiscal methods, the state has developed the engaging
theory that monies received and administered under the state law
fall into three different categories. "State" or fully public funds are
those wholly subject to the requirements of article 8, section 4. Pre-
sumably all revenues generally available for legislative appropriations
are paid into the treasury and can be expended only in accordance
with an appropriation that meets all constitutional requirements.,"
Then there is a category of "quasi-public" funds such as the income
from enterprise activities, the liquor control and toll bridge systems
for example, and the collections of the payroll tax for unemployment
compensation. These funds are not subject to appropriation. 2 Finally,
there seem to be "non-public" funds accruing where the function of
the state, or one of its agencies, is that of trustee or agent. Examples
are the trust and endowment for such purposes as employees' retire-
ment. These may or may not be administered by the treasurer as
custodian, but not in his official capacity as treasurer.," The proceeds
and transactions are reported as part of treasury operations, but it
appears that payments may be authorized by the legislature without
resorting to the biennial appropriation method." Some funds in the
40 The total of 535 million dollars includes transfers to the current school fund (231
million), appropriations for higher education (71.3 million), public school bond
redemption (5 million), teachers retirement and pension reserve (20.2 million), elec-
tive officials, legislative, and judiciary (7 million). The remainder, a little over 200
million dollars, is the estimated amount of public assistance grants which are substan-
tially controlled by the statutory formula, RCW 74.08.040.
41 This seems to follow from WAsHa. CONST. art. VII, § 4. To hold receipts outside
the treasury, some specific legislative action, usually a dedication, would be necessary.
Once in the treasury, the rigid appropriation requirement applies.
42 Liquor control, RCW 43.66.060-.070; toll bridges, RCW 47.56.150-.160; unem-
ployment compensation, RCW 50.16.
43 State Employees Retirement Bd. v. Yelle, 31 Wn.2d 87, 195 P2d 646, modified on
rehearing, 201 P.2d 172 (1948).
44 In this connection see the monthly treasurer's reports, "Statement of Fund Re-
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"non-public" category, however, are really operating funds collected,
held and expended without recourse to the treasury or to legislative
appropriation." These three classifications fail to capture a number
of intermediate situations. Probably no classification could. In fact,
no one is entirely certain how much money is collected, held and dis-
bursed in one or another official capacity, under the authority of
state law. 6
The dedicating or earmarking of monies deserves a word of com-
ment. Two types of revenue sources are constitutionally dedicated.
These are for schools and highways. 7 However, statutory dedications
are commonplace. There are at least 160 of these, exclusive of "local"
funds held outside the treasury." The purposes of dedication include
the support of specific operations, insurance payments, retirement
payments, debt service, revolving funds and special transactions
accounts.4 The net effect is the distribution of the monies of the
state into so many mutually exclusive pockets that the total condition
of the state is obscure. For example, as has been noted, the general
account of the general fund is in an overdraft condition amounting,
as of the end of the first year of the current biennium, to 37.6 million
dollars, which could reach between 80 and 100 million dollars by
the end of the current biennium.8 Meanwhile, special and temporary
ceipts, Disbursements and Transfers for the Month of. . ." In this statement, under
the category of Benefit and Retirement Funds both the Accident Fund and the
Employees Retirement Fund are listed. See Note 37 supra.
4"Interesting examples are the fifteen certification, inspection or license funds
administered through the Department of Agriculture. There are at least seven addi-
tional commissions in the general field of agriculture administering their own funds
outside of the treasury and without appropriation.
40 No more than an estimate is possible. The best guess of the total of all state gov-
ernment transactions during the current biennium, including transfers among funds, is
2.3 billion dollars. A net figure would be about 2 billion. Rounded items are general
fund and special accounts, 830 million; special funds (at least 130), 964 million; and
"local" funds held outside the treasury 508 million.
47 For schools, the permanent school fund, WASH. COxsT. art IX, § 3; for highways,
amendment 18.
48 The revenue administration subcommittee of the Tax Advisory Council noted 131
earmarked revenue funds and 33 special accounts within the general fund. See its
Report p. 8.
40 As examples of types; specific operation, the motor vehicle fund (highways);
insurance payments, the accident fund (workmen's compensation); retirement pay-
ments, state employment retirement fund; debt service, war veterans compensation
(bonuses) ; revolving, public service revolving; special transactions, suspense fund.
6o This estimate is derived as follows: Assuming that revenue receipts will fall no
more than 20 million dollars below original estimates, and that unobligated balances
and appropriation deficiencies will balance out, the overdraft would then be about 82
million. The overdraft at the beginning of the biennium, 29 million; excess of appro-
priations over estimated revenues, 33 million; revenue shrinkage below estimates 20
million. However, should appropriation deficiencies substantially exceed unobligated
balances, as now seems likely because of increased costs in public assistance due to
unemployment, and should revenue losses exceed 20 million, which is also entirely
possible, the overdraft would be increased.
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balances in the special accounts of the general fund, which are dedi-
cated, are sufficient to give the general fund as a whole a cash balance
of 25.7 million dollars." Remaining funds in the treasury have a
working margin of 102.4 million dollars, of which 82.7 million dollars
is held in current short-term investments." Thus a so-called "deficit"
in the general account of the general fund is not a cash deficit at all in
terms of the general condition of the treasury. If the assets of funds
held outside the treasury were considered, another picture would
emerge. Its proportions must be left to speculation.
Although the state as a whole is solvent, it should not be assumed
that no fiscal problems exist. The point of the matter is that one
compartment of the treasury receives the pressure of the increasing
costs of general services. That is the general account of the general
fund. The revenues attributable to this account are not adequate to
support the expenditure commitments against it. For the present,
the overdraft can be carried by interest-bearing interfund loans and
advances within the treasury." This practice cannot be continued
indefinitely; neither is it necessary or desirable to liquidate all of the
overdraft. An overdraft of some thirty million dollars would appear
to be manageable. 4
On balance, the conclusion is inescapable that the fiscal system of
the state needs revising so that all monies collected, administered and
expended under the authority of law can be processed through the
treasury, so that the fiscal resources of the state as a whole can be
utilized in a sound and flexible way, and so that the fiscal condition of
the state, inevitably complex, can nevertheless be reduced to a more
51 The 1955 legislature abolished ten special funds in the treasury and paid their
balances into the general fund. Also it converted twenty-seven separate treasury funds
and two local funds into special accounts within the general fund. This was done by
the amendment of RCW 43.79. While these special accounts maintain their separate
identity in the records of the budget office and the auditor, and their use is restricted
to "ear-marked" purposes, their balances are merged with the general account of the
general fund in the treasurer's records. Consequently the treasurer's general fund
balance can include credits that are only temporary. For example, the present
general fund balance on the treasurer's records is made possible by the deposit in the
fund of the proceeds of bond sales for construction purposes which proceeds are not
wholly obligated. This provides currently some 53 million dollars, of which about 30,
million will probably not be expended during the current biennium. All amounts, and
those in the text, are derived from the general fund report issued by the director of the
budget, as of June 30, 1958.
52 See the monthly report of the treasurer, June, 1958, Statement of Fund Receipts,
Disbursements and Transfers for the Month of June, 1958, p. 142.
53 Authorized by RCW 43.84.100.
54 The 30 million dollars is an estimate based upon the apparent requirements of the
treasury for working cash. If all of the overdraft were to be liquidated over a single
biennium the result would be to increase the treasury cash balances available for short-
term investment.
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understandable statement. This will necessitate the amendment of
article 8, section 4 as amended by amendment 11."
There remains the fourth dimension of the context in which state
and local government functions. This is taxation. Over the years of
its statehood, Washington has accumulated an impressive tangle of
constitutional provisions and of judicial decisions applying them. So
complex, and so forbidding, is this area of the law that a much more
intensive exploration becomes essential. To this attention is now
turned.
II
The power of taxation is universally recognized as one of the most
important attributes of a sovereign state. Without this power, the
state cannot exist. Notwithstanding virtually universal recognition
of this proposition, the taxing power of a state is substantially re-
stricted. The first of the operative limitations upon legislative selec-
tion of the objects of taxation are economic and social factors, to-
gether with their concomitant political pressures. The second of
the restrictions, or limitations, are those which are imposed by the
constitutions and judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions.
Under the form of government which exists in the United States,
the constitutional limitations upon the taxing power of a state, and of
its legislature, are also dual. The first are those which inhere
in the federal system of government. These are the limitations and
restrictions which are found in, or implied from, the Constitution of
the United States. The second type of limiting provisions are those
in the constitution of the state.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
The provisions of the Federal Constitution which significantly affect
the taxing power of the states are not numerous, but these provisions
play an important part in the shaping of state tax policies. Notwith-
standing their importance, only a few general comments will be made
with respect to the federal constitutional provisions in this review
of the constitutional restrictions upon the taxing power in the state of
Washington.
The due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities
clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
6 This exploration omits the problems of bonded debt. These are so involved that
separate treatment is essential.
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tion5" have been construed to apply to all types of state-levied taxes.
Although provisions of similar import are included in the state con-
stitution,5' the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and
other federal courts interpreting the provisions of the Federal Consti-
tuition, rather than those of the state courts, are controlling," and
the federal court, rather than the state court, has final say with
respect to compliance or non-compliance by a state taxing act with
the requirements of the Federal Constitution.5 9  The cases which
must be considered are legion in number. And because of the variety
of tax types and variations, ranging from minor to major, in the
provisions of the tax laws considered in different cases, the decisions
are difficult to classify and frequently difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile."
Due process of law. The requirement of due process of law has
both substantive and procedural aspects in its application to state
taxing laws. In its substantive aspect it guards against extraterritorial
application of taxes levied either by the state or by its municipal
subdivisions. Due process problems arise under state laws imposing
taxes on property, tangible"' or intangible, 2 on transfers at death, 3
on net income," and on the sale or use of tangible personal property."
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
5T WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 (due process). WASH. CONST. art I, § 12 (special privi-
leges and immunities) ; the Washington court has stated that this section is comparable
in meaning to the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2. Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wn.2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941) ; State v.
Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 34 (1902).
58 See cases cited note 57, supra.
59 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
60 For a collection of cases and other materials relating to the problem, see I
FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE, BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND OTHER
PROBLEMS 488-665 (1954).
6" Recent cases involving state taxation of the operating properties of interstate air
carriers are illustrative: Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 950 (1944);
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
62Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936), is a leading case on the
"commercial domicile" aspect, which is only one of many aspects with respect to
intangibles.
63 Among many cases involving such taxes are Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473
(1925) (tangible personalty) and Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) (intangi-
bles).
04 For example, New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) (resident's
income from land outside the taxing state) and Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920)
(non-resident's income from property and business within the taxing state).65 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) and General Trading Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) involve the extent of the state's power to
require an out-of-state vendor to collect use tax when selling goods to residents of the
taxing state. The opposing results in the cited cases illustrate the difficulties encoun-
tered by the states under this constitutional requirement in establishing effective col-
lection procedures. On the aspect of territorial application of such taxes, see Graubard,
Special Problems in the Levy of Municipal Excise Taxes, 8 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROD.
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Judicial attitudes with respect to the extent of the restrictions imposed
have also varied. Such changes have been most pronounced in the
area of taxation of intangible personal property. For a period of ten
years the view prevailed that taxation of intangibles by more than
one state violated due process."6 "The Court acted as arbiter of the
competing claims of the states by fixing a single and exclusive locus
for the taxation of each type of intangible-whether the state of the
creditor, the debtor, incorporation, or commercial domicile."'" The
majority of the Court now seems to have returned to the view that
the due process clause prohibits extraterritorial application of a
state's taxing laws but does not prohibit taxation of intangibles by
more than one state. Professor Hellerstein's comment regarding the
present status is most enlightening:
It is interesting to note the similarity of the conception of extra-
territoriality as the basis for invalidating taxes under the Due Process
Clause and the requirement of apportionment as the prerequisite of
validation of certain taxes under the Commerce Clause. Both simmer
down to essentially the same result, namely, that a state can tax only
what it "justly attributable" to it. Under both clauses, the judgments
of what is "justly attributable" to a state is made by the Court. 68
The due process requirement unquestionably poses many and difficult
problems for the state in framing tax laws of every kind. The pro-
cedural aspects of due process can be met with careful planning and
drafting, but from the substantive aspect the problems are more intri-
cate. Although the restrictions are not as stringent under the present
approach of the Supreme Court as they were in earlier years, the
restrictions confronting the states under this constitutional requirement
are substantial. It seems, moreover, that the obstacles encountered in
connection with taxes on property and taxes on net income are, at the
present time, less formidable than those arising in connection with
taxes on gross income and taxes on the sale, or the use, of property.
Equal protection. The requirement of equal protection of the laws69
613 (1941) and Brown, Some Legal Aspects of State Sales and Use Taxes, 18 IND.
L. J. 77 (1943).
6 See HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATIoN OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933).
,17 HELERESTIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATIoN CASES AND MATERIALS 486 (1952).
68 Ibid.
03 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2. The Washington court holds that WASH. CONST.
art I, § 12, imposes a similar requirement, although § 12 is phrased in terms of a pro-
hibition of special privileges and immunities, Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wn.2d 360, 112
P.2d 522 (1941).
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also applies to all types of state and local taxes." The equal protection
clause imposes a general requirement of reasonableness in the classifi-
cation of the persons and property to which a tax is applicable. It
forbids selection of the tax subject on an arbitrary basis and bars the
drawing of lines between taxability and nontaxability without reason
to justify the difference in tax treatment. The legislature, however, has
a broad discretion under this provision. The following statement of the
United States Supreme Court is indicative of that Court's interpreta-
tion of the constitutional language and its method of applying it to
state tax statutes:
The States, in the exercise of their taxing power, as with respect to
the exertion of other powers, are subject to the requirements of the due
process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but that Amendment imposes no i-on rule of equality, prohibiting the
flexibility and variety that are appropriate to schemes of taxation. The
State may tax real and personal property in a different manner. It may
grant exemptions. The State is not limited to ad valorem taxation. It
may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and profes-
sions and may vary the rates of excise upon various products. In levy-
ing such taxes, the State is not required to resort to close distinctions
or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to compo-
sition, use, or value. To hold otherwise would be to subject the essential
taxing power of the State to an intolerable supervision, hostile to the
basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection
which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to assure.
71
The approach of the Washington court is the same with respect to
taxes governed by this constitutional provision."2 The fact that the
equal protection clause and its state counterpart a'low this latitude to
the legislature in the selection and classification of tax subjects is a
most significant one in this state. In the case of all state-levied taxes,
other than taxes on "property" within the meaning of article 1, section
1, of the state constitution, 3 the boundaries of the state legislature's
power of classification are determined under the equal protection
clause, rather than under the much more highly restrictive "uniformity"
70 The requirement in WASH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 9, that local "taxes shall be uniform
in respect to persons and property within the jursidiction of the body levying the same"
is similar in effect. Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907).
71 Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930).
72 Among other cases, see State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91
(1933) (state-levied excise tax) ; Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907)
(city-levied poll tax).
7 3 WASH. CoNsT. amend. 14 (1930).
[AUTUMIN
1]ASHINGTON'S FISCAL CRISIS
requirement of the above article 1, section 1. Numerous cases, here-
after discussed, illustrate the enormous differences which flow from
this constitutional distinction.
Not all state taxes are upheld by the courts when challenged under
the equal protection clause,7" but the requirement of equal protection,
unlike other constitutional provisions here discussed, does not substan-
tially deprive a state of the flexibility which it needs to formulate a fair
and adequate tax structure. 75
Commerce clause. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." 6 The restrictions upon state taxing power of
this, the commerce clause, are the most far-reaching of any of the
federal constitutional provisions. As a clearly recognized principle of
constitutional law, the doctrine that the interstate commerce clause
imposes restrictions upon the states in the exercise of their taxing
power, even though Congress has not seen fit to legislate on the matter,
goes back to 1872."7 Since action by Congress defining the limits of
state power has not been regarded as necessary,78 the standards by
which the validity of a state tax is determined are wholly of judicial
origin and development. The nature of the test which the Court applies
in deciding whether a state tax is valid or invalid under this clause has
been, and still is, vague and uncertain.
From 1872 until 1938, the Court reiterated in case after case a mean-
ingless verbal formula that a state tax which imposes a burden on
interstate commerce is void, but that a tax is valid if the burden on such
commerce is indirect. Professor Hartman's comment on this verbal
formula, in his excellent treatise, is both enlightening and apt:
The view that interstate commerce is immune from taxation, with
its concomitant expressions of 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and bur-
dens, for many years remained the alleged test by which the Court
struck down a wide variety of state taxes. This conceptual and un-
74 Examples, at the state level, are Aberdeen Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, 157
Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536, 290 Pac. 697 (1930) (a case, it appears, of misplaced reliance
upon Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928); State v. Inland
Empire Refineries, 3 Wn.2d 651, 101 P.2d 975 (1940); but see Texas Co. v. Cohn,
8 Wn.2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941).
75 For an excellent discussion of the equal protection requirement see Sholley, Equal
Protectlio ins Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REv. 229, 338 (1938), 5 SELEcTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 (1938).
78 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
77 Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872). Adoption of this view
was undoubtedly forecast in earlier decisions.
78 For a discussion of the conflicting views and theories see HARTMAN, STATE TAxA-
TION OF INTERSTATE CowmERc 5-13, 25-27 (1953).
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realistic mode of judicial thought gave very little consideration to the
practical question of economic burden of the tax. What condemned the
tax was not any actual or probable hampering effect of the exaction on
the commerce; the vice of an invalid tax was simply the "direct" bear-
ing of the tax on interstate commerce and that alone. That brand of
doctrinal declaration, of course, assumed a trustworthiness in the test
which did not exist. It gave very little help to the legislator, the lower
courts or the taxpaying business man in predicting whether a par-
ticular tax would be valid. The alleged test simply implied the impo-
tence of state power; it described a result reached, not the reasons for
that result. The Court was more concerned with captions than with
consequences."9
Under the leadership of Justice Stone, a more realistic approach was
taken for a period of about eight years:80
In 1938, he [Justice Stone] began to lay the foundation for an
approach to the question of the validity of state taxes which would
give more consideration to the possible economic effect of the particu-
lar tax on interstate commerce and less consideration to the formal
aspects of the tax. Explicit, too, in his approach is the essential fair-
ness that interstate commerce bear its fair share of the cost of local
governments whose protection it received....
Regardless of the approach, Justice Stone greatly expanded the
power of States to tax. Never before had such integral parts of an
interstate transaction been considered as taxable. He made "taxable
events" blossom where they never had budded before. He made inter-
state commerce "pay its way."8'
In 1946, however, the approach espoused by Justice Stone "was fairly
well shunted aside ... in Freeman v. Hewitt, which marked a recrudes-
cence of what was tantamount to the old, imprecise and unreliable
'direct-indirect' burdens test for determining the constitutionality of a
state tax."8 2
Under the decisions of the Court, the interstate commerce clause is
held to impose restrictions, varying in nature and extent, upon all
types of state-levied taxes, including property taxes on articles trans-
ported in interstate commerce and on the vehicles or instrumentalities
employed in such transportation, 3 privilege taxes," taxes for the use of
79 Id. at 31.
80 The beginning of the period is marked by Justice Stone's opinion in Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). Its end is marked by Justice Frank-
furter's opinion for the majority in Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
81 HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 78, at 33-34, 40.82 Id. at 41.
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public facilities, " use and sales taxes, 86 gross receipts taxes, 7 and
capital stock franchise taxes.88
Although the impact of the commerce clause is significant in con-
nection with all of these taxes, the restrictive effects are greatest in
connection with sales taxes and taxes measured by gross income. In
this state, which relies so heavily upon sales and gross income taxes,
the impact of the constitutional provision is, consequently, enormous.
The retail sales tax cannot be applied to many sales made by distrib-
utors doing busines in this state."s Gross income or gross proceeds of
sales derived from activities performed within the state, or partly
within and partly outside the state, are in most instances completely
immunized from a state-levied business and occupation tax."0 These
effects are in marked contrast to the lighter impact of the interstate
commerce clause upon state net income taxes. Although a state tax
measured by net income cannot be imposed upon one whose sole
activities in the state are interstate in character, 9' a state tax on net
income of a person or corporation doing both intrastate and interstate
business can be levied with respect to receipts from the interstate, as
well as the intrastate, activities."- Receipts, substantial in amount,
which are excluded from the tax base when the state imposes its tax
upon gross income may, thus, enter into the tax base when the state
imposes its tax upon net income.
STATE CONSTITUTION
In addition to the general requirements of due process and equal
protection previously discussed, the constitution of the State of Wash-
ington also contains a number of provisions which relate specifically to
8 3
1d. at 73, c. IV. Professor Hartman's treatise is a study of the impact of the
interstate commerce clause on state taxing power. It is comprehensive, thorough, and
informative. The treatise is recommended as the best guide to the problems of state
taxation under this constitutional provision.
84 Id. at 96, c. V.
8 5 Id. at 122, c. VI.
s1 Id. at 131, c. VII.
8
7 Id. at 180, c. VIII.
8 Id. at 215, c. IX.
Il See Tax Commission of the State of Washington, Excise Tax Division, Rules
Relating to the Revenue Act of the State of Washington 118, Rule 193 (1956).
00 Cases holding the Washington act invalid as to particular types of business activi-
ties are Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S.650 (1936) (radio
broadcasting) ; Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90
(1937) (stevedoring services) ; Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S.
434 (1939) (fruit brokers) ; Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wn.2d 658, 192 P.2d 976
(1948) (wholesale distributor selling articles produced outside the state).
9l Spector Motor Serv., Inc., v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
02 Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942). See HARTMAN, STATE
TAX ATION OF INTERSTATE CommERcE 63 (1953).
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taxation. The seventh article of the constitution is devoted wholly to
the subject, and it is the most far-reaching in effect of all the specific
tax provisions."
Article seven, section one: taxes on property. Amendment fourteen,
adopted 1930, consolidated into a single section a revision of constitu-
tional provisions which were originally set forth in the first four sections
of the article. The first sentence, which prohibits suspension or sur-
render of the power of taxation, applies to all taxes. The second clause
of the second sentence, which sets forth a public purpose requirement,
has also been construed to apply to "all taxes."9 The first clause of
the second sentence, as well as the following five sentences of the sec-
tion, have been held applicable to property taxes only.9"
The first clause of the second sentence reads as follows: "All taxes
shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax.. ." This permits classification 6
of property for tax purposes but requires uniformity within each class .
7
The power to classify property is, however, limited by the fourth sen-
tence: "All real estate shall constitute one class: Provided, That the
legislature may tax mines and mineral resources and lands devoted to
reforestation by either a yield tax or ad valorem tax at such rate as it
may fix, or by both." The legislature, consequently, may tax real estate
differently than personal property, but all real estate except mines,
mineral resources, and lands devoted to reforestation, must be taxed
alike. Personal property, however, may be divided into different
classes if the legislature so desires, and each class of personal property
taxed in a different manner or at a different rate.9" The court has stated
that the legislature has a very wide discretion in classifying personal
property for tax purposes, that the question of what property consti-
9 3 WASM. CoNST. art. VII has been amended four times since the constitution was
adopted in 1889. Only one other article of the constitution has been more frequently
amended-article II, relating to the legislative department. The score favors article II
only because an amendment relating to taxes on motor vehicles was inserted as a new
section in that article rather than in article VII, where it might well have been placed.
94 State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle, 9 Wn2d 317, 115 P.2d 373 (1941).95 Among numerous cases so holding are State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash.
402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933) ; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14
(1935); and Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211, P.2d 651 (1949).
96 Prior to amend. 14 (1930), WAsH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2 (1889), required that
taxes on property be both uniform and equal. The latter requirement-that taxes be
"equal"-barred all classification. Amendment 14 eliminated this "equality" require-
ment to permit classification.
97 State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P.2d 539
(1934).
98 All personal property within each class must be taxed uniformly. State ex rel.
Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P.2d 539 (1934).
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tutes a class is one primarily for the legislature, and that the courts
cannot interfere with the legislative determination unless the classifica-
tion is clearly arbitrary and without any reasonable basis." The ap-
parent freedom of legislative choice is, however, limited by the manda-
tory exemptions stated in the sixth sentence of this section: "Property
of the United States and of the state, counties, school districts and
other municipal corporations, and credits secured by property actually
taxed in this state, not exceeding in value the value of such property,
shall be exempt from taxation."
Passing without comment, at this point, the clause exempting prop-
erty of the United States, the state, and its subdivisions, the clause
exempting "credits" is a highly significant limitation upon the general
power to classify personal property for tax purposes. The constitu-
tional language has never been construed by the court,"' and its mean-
ing is far from clear. It exempts only those credits which are "secured
by property actually taxed in this state." What are credits so
"secured"? A note secured by a mortgage on land in this state is
obviously exempt if the land is assessed and the tax levied thereon is
paid. But is the note constitutionally exempt if there is a default in
payment of the tax levied on the land? Is a vendor's right to receive
payments under an executory, forfeitable contract for the sale of land,
upon which real property tax is levied and paid, a credit so secured?
Such payments are not "secured" by the taxed land. The vendor may
repossess the land upon a default in payment; but the right to receive
payments is, thereby, obliterated-not secured. Does this constitute
a credit which is "secured" in the constitutional sense? What if the
subject matter of the conditional sale contract is an automobile, which
is subject to an annual excise in lieu of personal property tax? Or a
refrigerator purchased by a homeowner for use in his own home, which
is specifically exempted by statute from personal property tax?' 10 Is
the right of the seller of the automobile or the refrigerator to receive
the balance of the sale price a "credit" which is constitutionally
exempt? Is a share of corporate stock in a Washington corporation,
r10 Bates v. McLeod, 11 Wn2d 648, 120 P.2d 472 (1941) ; Libby, McNeill & Libby
v. Ivarson, 19 Wn.2d 723, 144 P.2d 258 (1943).
1Jo In 1931 (the legislative session immediately following adoption of this constitu-
tional provision), the legislature exempted all credits from the property tax. Wash.
Laws 1931, c. 96, § 1. This exemption has not been altered or repealed. See RCW
84.36.070. The constitutional validity of this exemption was sustained in State ex rel.
Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 2 P.2d 653 (1931).
101 RCW 82.44.020; 82.44.130 (motor vehicle excise tax, in lieu of personal property
tax thereon); RCW 84.36.110 (1) (exemption of household furnishings of home-
owner).
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all of the assets of which consist of taxable real estate in Washington,
a credit "secured" in the constitutional sense? A shareholder is not a
creditor. Is his ownership interest "secured" in the constitutional
sense? If it is, then what is the extent of the constitutional exemption
in the more true to life situation in which the corporation's assets con-
sist of some taxed real estate, some taxable tangible personal property,
some specifically exempted cash, some bank deposits, some school
district bonds, and, possibly, a block of General Motors or United
States Steel shares? And then there is the case of the state resident, an
individual, who owns ten shares of the common stock of a foreign
corporation which has a branch office and warehouse in this state.
What part of the value of the ten shares is constitutionally exempt from
personal property tax under the "credits" clause and its qualifying
modifier "not exceeding in value the value of such property"?
Meditation upon these relatively simple factual patterns leads inevi-
tably to the conclusion that the complexities of interpretation and the
practical difficulties of administration under this constitutional lan-
guage are insurmountable as applied to any credits which have even a
remote relationship to real or tangible personal property which is
subject to taxation in this state. Conceding that the constitutional
language permits (1) taxation of the full value of credits representa-
tive of interests in, or "secured" by property, or rights enforceable
against persons wholly outside this state, (2) taxation of the full value
of credits representative of rights solely against persons or in or
"secured" by untaxed property within the state, and (3) taxation of
some portion of the value of various other credits, the legislature is
confronted with another constitutional hurdle. While framing a tax on
credits which meets the requirements of the Washington constitutional
provision, it must also comply with the requirements of the privileges
and immunities clause and of the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution."°2 This tangle of federal and state constitutional prob-
lems, coupled with the administrative complexities, including the bur-
dens of special accounting records to supply the data required for pro-
rating of value, which would be imposed on the taxpayer, means that
for all practical purposes the Washington constitutional provision for-
bids the imposition of a property tax upon all forms of intangible per-
sonal property.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences of amendment fourteen relate
102 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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to exemption of property from taxation. The fifth sentence states:
"Such property as the legislature may by general laws provide shall be
exempt from taxation." This general statement of legislative discre-
tion respecting exemptions is qualified by the sixth sentence,0 3 pro-
viding constitutional exemption of the property of the United States,
the state, counties, school districts, and other municipal corporations,0 "
as well as certain credits. The general statement of this sentence
would, furthermore, appear to be limited by the requirement of the
preceding sentence that all real estate, except mineral and reforesta-
tion land, constitutes one class of property. The court, however, has
construed the words "such property" in the general exemption power
provision to embrace real property as well as personal property, not-
withstanding the clear statement in the preceding sentence that all real
estate constitutes one class.' This shows vividly how the strait-jacket
has been bound around the state legislature. With two exceptions of
very limited applicability, the legislature is forbidden to classify real
estate for the purpose of raising revenue for governmental operations.
But the legislature is given complete freedom to classify real estate for
the purpose exempting property from taxation.
With respect to personal property, the power of the legislature to
exempt classes of such property is unlimited, except for the limitation
in the final sentence of the section,' which, seemingly imposes a ceiling
of three hundred dollars upon the amount of the exemption which the
legislature may grant with respect to the personal property of the head
of a family. In practice this limitation seems to have been disregarded
without challenge." 7
133 For text see page 249, supra.
104 The constitutional provision is self-executing and grants mandatory exemption
of both the land and personal property of the specified governmental units. Puget
Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cowlitz County, 38 Wn.2d 907, 234 P.2d 506 (1951).
105 State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 2 P.2d 653 (1931) ; Kennewick
Irrigation Dist. v. Benton County, 179 Wash. 1, 35 P.2d 1109 (1934).
10u "The legislature shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to exempt personal
property to the amount of three hundred ($300.00) dollars for each head of a family
liable to assessment and taxation under the provisions of the laws of this state of which
the individual is the actual and bona fide owner." This language was added to the
original § 2 of art. VII by amend. 3, adopted 1900. Under the uniformity and equality
requirement of § 2 at that time, this provision was essential to permit such exemption
of personal property. It does not appear to be necessary when the sole requirement is
"uniformity" and the legislature has the power to exempt personal property by general
law, as the previous sentence states. The same language was, however, carried over
into § 2 as revised. Its sole effect in this context appears to be to impose a limitation
upon the legislature with respect to the dollar value of this type of personal property
which it may exempt.
107 RCW 84.36.110 (1) exempts all household goods and furnishings actually used
by a homeowner in his residence and all personal effects of any person. There is no
limitation as to the value of the property exempted under this subsection. RCW
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With the two exceptions previously mentioned, amendment fourteen
is applicable to property taxes only. The third sentence of the section
contains the following definition: "The word 'property' as used herein
shall mean and include everything, whether tangible or intangible,
subject to ownership." The language leaves no doubt that the intent
is to give to the word its broadest denotation, and the court has con-
sistently so construed it."8 On the basis of this constitutional definition
of the word "property," the court has also consistently held that a net
income tax-whether levied on net income as such,"19 upon individuals
for the "privilege of receiving income, 11. or upon corporations as an
excise for the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise"'-is a
tax on property within the meaning of this constitutional provision.
Being a tax on "property" within the meaning of this section of the
constitution, the tax is subject to the uniformity and restricted classi-
fication requirements of this provision. Whether denominated as
"upon" net income or as an excise measured by net income, the tax
as applied to rental from land is treated as a tax upon real estate, a
treatment which creates a prohibited classification in distinguishing be-
tween income-producing and non-income-producing real estate."' Also,
graduation of the rates of tax and the granting of exemptions of differ-
ent amounts dependent upon marital status have been held violative
of amendment fourteen uniformity, because "all net income consti-
tutes a single class of property.""'  Why this is so, the court has never
attempted to explain. The reason for this lack of explanation seems
apparent. The wording of the amendment does not support it,"' and
the decisions of other courts, federal and state, uphold such legislative
84.36.110 (2) provides a further exemption of personal property of the head of a
family, not exempted under subsection (1). The exemption under subsection (2) is
limited to $300 of actual value. The constitutional validity of the dual exemptions
granted by this section has not been raised in the state supreme court.
108 See, e.g., American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Whatcom County, 13 Wn2d 295,
124 P.2d 963 (1942).
109 Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
110 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
11 Power, Inc., v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
112 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 222, 53 P.2d 607, 612 (1936).
113 Id. at 220 and 222, 53 P.2d at 611 and 612.
114 As pointed out above, art. VII, § 1 (amend. 14), permits classification of per-
sonal property. After eliminating income from real estate (see note 112, supra), the
net income which remains must be, under the court's theory, personal property. The
court's statement that "'net income,'... under the fourteenth amendment, constitutes
one class of property" has no support whatever in the language of that amendment. On
the contrary, the well-known canon of interpretation, expressio unius, exclusio alterius,
requires the construction that no property other than real estate (expressly stated to
constitute one class) does constitute one class within the meaning of the consitutional
language.
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classification of net income under constitutional provisions requiring
uniformity."'
On the other hand, the court has just as consistently held that taxes
upon business activities, 1 ' upon retail sales, 17 and upon the use of
articles of tangible personal property "I are excise taxes and not taxes
on "property" in the constitutional sense. Since they are not property
taxes, the uniformity and restricted classification requirements of the
fourteenth amendment are inapplicable. Each of these taxes was,
then, upheld as an appropriate legislative selection of the objects of
taxation under the less restrictive provisions of article 1, sections 3
and 12, of the state constitution and the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution. This result was reached even though the tax
base in some instances includes gross income attributable to the use
of real estate"' and even though the tax rates vary as between gross
income, or gross proceeds of sales, derived from different sources, 2 '
and even though some types of gross income, or gross proceeds of sales,
are entirely excluded from the tax base.12' This, the court has con-
sistently said, is, however, all right, because these are not taxes on
"property" in the constitutional sense but are excises. If the tax
115 When a net income tax is treated as a tax on property, the precise character of
the constitutional requirement is most important in determining whether graduation
of rates and other forms of classification of net income are permissible. If the consti-
tution requires both uniformity and equality, classification, and graduation of rates,
is barred. But if the constitution requires uniformity only, classification and graduation
of rates should be permissible. The Washington court, possibly along with one or two
others, has failed to recognize this most important distinction. For discussion of
various aspects of constitutionality of state net income taxes, see Brown, The Nature
of the Income Tax, 17 MiNi. L. REv. 127 (1933) ; Harsch, State Income Taxation as
Affected by Property Tax Limitations, 6 WASH. L. REv. 97 (1931); Comment, Con-
stitutionality of State Income Taxes, 8 WAsH. L. REv. 81 (1933) ; Recent Case, 11
WAsH. L. REv. 172 (1936).
116 State ex rcl. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P2d 91 (1933).
111 orrow v. Henneford 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935) (general retail sales
tax) ; Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) (selective retail
sales tax-cigarettes).
118 Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935) (general tax
on use of tangible personalty purchased at retail).
119 Under the business and occupation tax income from the rental of real estate is
specifically exempted from tax, as are gross proceeds from farming operations. In
numerous instances, however, the use of land is an important factor in the production
of the gross income upon which the tax is levied. An example is the charges for hotel
and motel accommodations and for space in a trailer court, which enter into the base
for both the business-occupation tax and the retail sales tax.
120 For example, under the business-occupation tax the rates of tax on wholesale
sales differed from the rate on sales at retail. Laws 1933, c. 191, § 2 (2) (c) and (d).
The rate applicable to gross income from service businesses differs from the rate
applicable to retail and wholesale sales. A different rate is applicable to wholesale
grain dealers than is applicable to other wholesale dealers. RCW 82.04.250; 82.04.260;
82.04.270; 82.04.290.
121 Examples under the business-occupation tax are gross income from rental of real
estate and gross income from farming operations, inter alia. RCW 82.04.390; 82.04.330.
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is in fact an excise-and how the legislature labels it is of no conse-
quence in determining this "fact"' 22 -the legislature's power to select
the subject and to classify is limited only by the requirement that there
be some reasonable basis to support the legislative determination." 3
The court cannot interfere with that determination except for arbi-
trary action, abuse, or constructive fraud appearing on the face of the
act or from facts of which the court may take judicial knowledge. -4
In light of these judicial pronouncements, what is it, then, that de-
termines whether a tax is a tax on "property," which, if a tax other
than the traditional ad valorem property tax, would for all practical
purposes be doomed to invalidity under the "uniformity" requirement
of the fourteenth amendment, or an excise, with respect to which the
legislative power of selection of object and choice of rate is limited only
by the test of reasonableness? No one has ever questioned the propo-
sition that the traditional ad valorem tax on real and personal property,
levied annually at rates determined by appropriate authorities of the
state and its various taxing districts, is a tax on "property" within the
meaning of the constitutional provision. The question is: What other
taxes constitute taxes on "property" in the constitutional sense?
The fact that liability for the tax depends upon performance of an
act or a continuing series of acts by the taxpayer is a significant
factor,125 but it is not the controlling factor. This is demonstrated
by the decisions holding invalid a tax upon the act or privilege of re-
ceiving income-specifically denominated by the legislature an excise
rather than a tax on property"--or upon the privilege of exercising
the corporate franchise. 7 Although a property value base is an almost
universal feature of property taxes as they are known to the citizen
unitiated in constitutional lore, the fact that the tax base is the value
of property, real or personal, does not mean that the tax is a tax on
"property" in the constitutional sense. The inheritance tax, with
three different classes and differing schedules of graduated rates
applicable to each class, is an excise, not a property tax."2 An annual
222 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 217, 53 P.2d 607, 610 (1936).
123 Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn. 2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949).
124 State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933).
125 State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933) ; Supply Laundry
Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934) ; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183
Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935) ; State ex rel. Hansen v. Salter, 190 Wash. 703, 70 P.2d
1056 (1937).
126 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
127 Power, Inc., v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
128 State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 445, 71 Pac. 20, 22 (1902).
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tax on motor vehicles, levied at a fixed percentage of the fair market
value of each vehicle, is an excise tax, not a property tax." 9 A tax on
producers or manufacturers of tangible personal property, at a specified
percentage of the value of the property produced or manufactured, is
an excise, not a property tax."'
Whether the tax has but a single impact upon a particular taxpayer
with respect to a particular subject matter.3 ' or is a periodically re-
curring levy 3. also lacks significance in determining whether the tax
is an excise or a tax on "property" in the constitutional sense.
Except for one, all other distinguishing features seem equally un-
fruitful. The one distinguishing feature is that of the measure of tax.
If net income is utilized to determine the amount of tax liability, it is
a tax on "property" in the constitutional sense. If the gross product,
the gross selling price, the gross purchase price, or even the fair
market value of an article 33 is utilized to determine the amount of
tax liability, it is an excise, not a "property" tax in the constitutional
sense. When the amount of tax is determined by reference to "net
income," it is a property tax. But when the amount of the tax is
determined by reference to the gross income or the gross amount or
value, unreduced by costs or expenditures, the tax is not on "property"
in the constitutional sense. The incongruity of the situation is appar-
ent when the decisions are laid alongside the constitutional definition
that property "shall mean and include everything, tangible or intang-
ible, subject to ownership." The money or other property (tangible)
which comes into the taxpayer's physical possession or the legally en-
forceable right (intangible) which comes into the taxpayer's legal pos-
session is not something subject to ownership. But that which remains
after reducing the gross amount received or receivable by deductions
for cost (whether actually paid or legally incurred without payment)
and depreciation (for which no actual outlay is currently required) and
policy-determined amounts, such as the deduction for personal
129 State ex rel. Hansen v. Salter, 190 Wash. 703, 70 P.2d 1056 (1937).
120 State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933).
131 This is generally true in the case of the retail sales tax, a selective sales tax such
as a tax on gasoline or on cigarettes, a tax on the use of fuel oil or of articles of tangi-
ble personal property purchased at retail. It is also true in the case of the inheritance
tax and the gift tax. All of these are "excise," rather than property, taxes.
x2 This is clearly the situation in the case of the motor vehicle excise, as well as in
the case of a multitude of "license" taxes, such vehicle operator's license, fishing
licenses, etc. None of these are property taxes. But it is also applicable in the case of
the ad valorem tax on real and personal property, which is a "property" tax in the con-
stitutional sense.
133 The traditional ad valorem property tax is, of course, an exception to this.
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exemptions (for which the actual outlay may greatly exceed the amount
deductible)-this fictitious residue, the end product of a series of
arithmetic steps which the statute itself prescribes-is property in
the constitutional sense.
Article Seven, section two: forty-mill limitation. A new section two
was added to article seven of the state constitution by amendment
seventeen, approved in 1944. Its major feature is stated in the first
sentence, as follows: "(T) he aggregate of all tax levies upon real and
personal property by the state and all taxing districts now existing or
hereafter created; shall not in any year exceed forty mills on the
dollar of assessed valuation ... " This constitutional restriction upon
legislative power in the area of public finance has an interesting and
informative history. Beginning in 1932, similar, but more detailed,
forty-mill property tax levy limitation acts were proposed by initiative
and approved by the voters at each successive biennial general
election."' As an act approved by the electors could not, at that time,
be amended or repealed by the legislature for a period of two years
after it adoption,"' the legislature was, thus, effectively barred through-
out this period from authorizing any property tax levy in excess of
either the aggregate or the specific rate limitations contained in the
initiative measure then in effect. Nor could the legislature authorize
approval by the voters of a tax levy in excess of these limitations other
than in the manner, and subject to the detailed restrictions, set forth
in such initiative measure. Repeated submission of a new, although
sometimes unchanged in wording, rate limitation initiative measure at
the general election preceding each biennial legislative session was,
obviously and openly, designed to bar the legislature from increasing,
or authorizing local authorities to increase, the property tax levies for
either state or local purposes, regardless of what the costs of govern-
mental operations might be. But the legislature alone was left with
the responsibility of formulating and implementing a taxing program
adequate to finance the costs of state and local government, whatever
they might be. Prior to enactment of the first forty-mill measure, the
aggregate property tax levies had been substantially in excess of the
stated maximum levies in virtually every taxing district of the state.
The original forty-mill limitation measure had the effect, consequently,
134 Wash. Laws 1933, c. 4 (Init. No. 64) ; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 2 (Init. No. 94) ;
Wash. Laws 1937, c. 1 (Init. No. 114) ; Wash. Laws 1939, c. 2 (Init. No. 129);
Wash. Laws 1941, c. 176 (referendum).
135 WAsH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (c), adopted in amend. 7, approved 1912.
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of reducing the rate of levy in virtually every taxing district to levels
conforming with both the aggregate and the specific rate limitations
stated in the measure. Flexibility in property tax levy rates was a thing
of the past in virtually every taxing district. Due to the enforced
reduction in the pre-forty-mill limitation levy rates, revenue to cover
the deficit in existing government costs, as well as revenue to meet
the increasing costs of state and local government, had to be obtained
by levying taxes other than taxes on property, or by adopting more
effective listing and assessment procedures, which would increase the
base to which the fixed-millage-rate property tax levies could be ap-
plied.
Tiring of their self-imposed and expensive biennial task of sub-
mitting and propagandizing rate limitation initiatives, the sponsors of
these restrictive measures prevailed upon the legislature, at its 1943
session, to submit a constitutional amendment embodying the forty-
mill rate limitation principle. It proposed an aggregate levy limita-
tion of forty mills for the state and all taxing districts, but eliminated
the specific maximum millages,.applicable to the state, counties, cities
and school districts, which had been included in the earlier initiative
measures. The legislature, thus, could determine the maximum rate
of levy applicable to the state and to the local taxing districts, subject
to the restriction that the aggregate levies of all should not exceed
forty mills. This, the seventeenth amendment, was approved by the
voters at the general election in October, 1944.
Coupled with the forty-mill levy limitation is the further require-
ment that the "assessed valuation shall be fifty per centum of the true
and fair value of such property in money." This means that the effec-
tive rate limitation prescribed by the constitutional provision is twenty
mills on the actual value of property in the state, not the apparent forty
mills. Whaiever the constitution may prescribe with respect to the ratio
of assessed valuation to true value, the critical factor is the actual ratio
of assessed valuation to the fair value of the property taxed. Studies
have repeatedly shown that in actual practice the assessed valuations
extended on the property tax rolls are in the vast majority of cases
far below the constitutional ratio of fifty per cent of true and fair
value of the property in money." 6 Constitutional blocks to improve-
ment in assessment procedures, designed to correct this situation, are
hereafter discussed.
136 SUBCOMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REFORT ON
A STUDY OF REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1954).
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The term "taxing district" is defined to exclude port districts and
public utility districts, but to include all other subdivisions, municipal-
ities, districts, and agencies having the power to levy ad valorem taxes
on property." 7 The policy of excluding port districts and public utility
districts from the aggregate levy limitation was carried over from the
earlier initiative measures. The reasons underlying these exclusions
are obscure. If based upon the theory that the activities of such dis-
tricts are proprietary, rather than governmental, in character, it is to
be noted that cities and other taxing districts, subject to the aggregate
rate limitations, carry on activities of a proprietary nature. It appears,
however, that the maximum levy rates for port and public utility dis-
tricts are frozen at the maximum rates authorized by law at the time
of the adoption of the seventeenth amedment."'
The final sentence of the amendment, about four hundred words or
three paragraphs in length, sets up detailed specifications concerning
levies in excess of the prescribed rate limitation. Any levy in excess
of the limitation is prohibited unless the requirements of either (a),
(b) or (c) are met. Clause (a) permits an additional levy for one
year if the specific additional levy is approved by sixty per cent of
the electors voting on the proposition and if the number voting on it
is not less than forty per cent of the number of votes cast in the taxing
district at the last preceding general election. Such a proposition cannot
be submitted to a vote more than twice in one year. Clause (b) permits
additional levies for a period of years to pay the principal and interest
on general obligation bonds, the issuance of which is authorized by
the voters. Such bonds may issued "solely for capital purposes, other
than replacement of equipment." The same sixty per cent majority of
not less than forty per cent of the number who voted at the last pre-
ceding general election is required under (b) as is required under (a);
and there is the same restriction against submission of a proposition
more than twice in any period of twelve months. The maximum in-
debtedness provisions, which generally limit indebtedness to five per
cent of the assessed valuation of property in the district, are also ap-
plicable." 9 Bond issues "to refund any obligation bonds.., issued for
137 "The term 'taxing district' for the purposes of this section shall mean any politi-
cal subdivision, municipal corporation, district, or other governmental agency author-
ized by law to levy or have levied for it, ad valorem taxes on property, other than a
port or public utility district." Amend. 17, second sentence.
138 "Provided, however, That nothing herein shall prevent levies at the rates now
provided by law by or for any port or public utility district." Amend. 17, first sentence.
339 And Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall also be subject
to the limitations contained in Article VIII, Section 6, of this Constitution."
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capital purposes only" are specifically excepted from the requirements
of the section. Clause (c) authorizes a levy in excess of forty mills
"for the purpose of paying the principal or interest on general obliga-
tion bonds outstanding on December 6, 1934; or for the purpose of
preventing the impairment of the obligation of a contract when ordered
so to do by a court of last resort."
The constitutional property tax levy limitation thus limits not only
legislative discretion with respect to the proportion of the total tax
burden which may be imposed upon property, but also substantially
restricts the voters in any taxing district from voluntarily imposing
additional taxes on the property in the district for either its current
operating expenses or for capital improvements.
Article Seven, section three: federal agencies and instrumentalities:
Another new section was added to article VII by amendment nineteen,
approved November, 1946.14 It authorizes taxation of the United
States and its agencies and instrumentalities and taxation of their
property to the extent such taxation is permitted under the laws of
the United States. It also specifically abrogates any other provisions
of the state constitution purporting to exempt the federal government,
its agencies, or their property. 1'
The background of this constitutional provision is found in the doc-
trine of intergovernmental immunities, which the Supreme Court of
the United States held to be implicit in the federal form of government
established by the United States Constitution. Beginning with Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,'4" the federal Court has held that no state may
utilize its taxing power in a manner which will interfere with or hamper
the operations of the federal government or its agencies or instru-
mentalities. This implied constitutional restriction is applicable not
only to state and local taxes on the property but also to all other types
140 The text of the amendment, which is designated as section 3 of this article, is as
follows: "The United States and its agencies and instrumentalities, and their property,
may be taxed under any of the tax laws of this state, whenever and in such manner as
such taxation may be authorized or permitted under the laws of the United States, not-
withstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution of this State."
14' In Boeing Aircraft Co. v. R. F. C., 25 Wn.2d 652, 171 P.2d 838 (1946), decided
three months before amend. 19 was approved, the state court unanimously held that a
legislative act requiring taxation of federal property to the extent authorized by Con-
gress was effective, notwithstanding the constitutional provision exempting such prop-
erty. Amend. 19 thus operated to clear up the constitutional language, even though the
court had reached the desired conclusion without benefit of a constitutional amendment.
142 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
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or forms of state taxes.143 Congress, however, may waive the immunity
which the Constitution affords, and in the Buck Act,"' as well as other
acts, 4 ' Congress authorized the states to impose state taxes of specified
types to designated federal agencies or instrumentalities.
The constitution of this state, however, then contained several pro-
visions which could have been construed to bar the state from taking
full advantage of the federal waivers of tax immunity."' The manda-
tory exemption provision of article VII, section 1 (amendment four-
teen), specifically applied to property of the United States. This had
been construed, both judicially ' and administratively, to exempt the
property of the agencies and instrumentalities of the United States.
Under article twenty-five of the state constitution, the state, at the time
of admission to the Union, granted to the federal Congress exclusive
legislative power with respect to lands held or reserved by the United
States for military and other designated purposes. This prohibited ap-
plication of all state tax laws to property situated in, or to transactions
occurring on, the land so held, even though the owners of the property
or the parties to the taxable transactions were private citizens."' Fur-
thermore, article twenty-six of the state constitution is a compact with
the United States, under the terms of which the state ceded jurisdiction,
including its taxing power, with respect to lands owned by any Indian
or Indian tribe.'49 Section 3 of article VII, added by the nineteenth
amendment, removes these limiting provisions of the state constitu-
tion which might bar the legislature from taking full advantage of
Congress's waiver of federal immunities from state taxation. This,
however, is far from a complete solution of the problems which con-
front the states under the federal immunity doctrine. Congress has
not waived the constitutional immunity in all instances. The immunity
14S See Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HAgv. L.
REv. 633 (1945) " Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
HAev. L. REv. 757 (1945).
144 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (Supp. 1952).
14 An example is 12 U.S.C. § 548, which permits taxation of real, but not personal,
property of national banks (which are federal instrumentalities) and taxation of net
income, but not gross income, of such banks, in accord with detailed conditions set
forth in the statute.
146 But see comment on Boeing Aircraft Co. v. R.F.C., note 141, supra.
147 See, e.g., King County v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
282 Fed. 950 (9th Cir. 1922).
148 See Rupp, Jurisdiction Over Lands Ozned by the United States Within the State
of Washington (1939) 14 WASH. L. REv. 1, esp. 17.
149 The compact expressly permits taxation of lands owned by an Indian who has
severed his tribal relations. The article has been construed to permit state taxation of
non-Indians doing business within the limits of an Indian reservation. Neah Bay Fish
Co. v. Krummel, 3 Wn.2d 570, 101 P.2d 600 (1940).
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doctrine may have application to any type of tax which a state may
impose. Some recent judicial interpretations and the specific congres-
sional waivers have opened the way to broader application of state
tax laws than was formerly permissible. But the judicially evolved doc-
trine of federal immunity still has vitality in a variety of situa tions."'
The doctrine may have greater impact in one state than in another
because of the nature of the taxing structure. The existing tax struc-
ture in Washington places it in the position of being more restricted
by the doctrine than are some other states. A state tax on the net in-
come of individuals and corporations is applicable to income received
as compensation for services to the United States or any of its agencies,
as well as to net income from the performance of contracts with the
United States and any of its agencies.'51 In the case of state taxes on
sales or taxes measured by gross income, however, the federal immunity
doctrine presents greater hazards. Although a state tax on the gross
income of a federal contractor," 2 or upon sales to a federal contrac-
tor,"' 3 as well as a use tax on a federal contractor,'54 are generally not
barred by the federal immunity doctrine, such taxes cannot be applied
to the federal government itself, nor without congressional consent
to federal agencies or instrumentalities, nor in some instances to per-
sons performing contracts for the federal government or one of its
agencies.' Here the type of tax and its legal incidence may be the
critical factor in determining whether the state can or cannot impose
a tax on transactions involved in, or proceeds derived from, a federal
contract. The state which imposes a net income tax almost invariably
enjoys a preferred position in situations of this kind.
An interesting problem under the final clause of amendment nine-
teen ("notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution of
this state") is whether it overrides the state court's construction that
a tax on net income is a property tax within the meaning of article VII,
section 1, so that the state may now take advantage of the federal
160 The articles by Professor Reed Powell, cited note 143 supra, show the status of
the doctrine in the mid-forties. There have been numerous developments since these
articles were published.
151 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). Atldnson v. State
Tax Comm'n., 303 U.S. 20 (1938). See also 120 A.L.R. 1466 (1939).
152 For example, in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) and Silas
Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n., 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
"53 Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 599 (1941), among others.
1r4 Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
165 Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952). This is an excellent illus-
tration of the niceties upon which liability or non-liability for a state tax of this type
may depend.
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statute5 authorizing a state tax on, or measured by, the net income of
national banking associations. An earlier legislative attempt" 7 to levy
a tax which would meet the requirements of this federal statute was
held invalid in the first of the long line of decisions which have scuttled
taxes on, or measured by, net income in this state.5 8 If the court would
construe the language of the final clause of amendment nineteen to
override the uniformity requirement of amendment fourteen, and if the
court, under the equal protection clause, would uphold the classifiica-
tion of the financial institutions which Congress has declared to be in
the same class as national banking institutions, this state could, with-
out constitutional amendment, avail itself of this long-forbidden source
of revenue which many other states are utilizing.
Other sections of article seven. Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 of article VII
do not appear to impose any substantial restrictions upon legislative
formulation of state tax policies. Although three of these sections pose
interesting questions in connection with state fiscal policies and pro-
cedures, discussion of them is here omitted.
Article seven, section nine and article twelve, section eleven: taxes
for local purposes. The taxing power of the subdivisions of state gov-
ernment-counties, cities, towns, school districts, and other subdivi-
sions existing under legislative authorization-is the subject matter of
two sections of the state constitution. The first of these is article VII,
section 9:
For all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested
with authority to assess and collect taxes and such taxes shall be uni-
form in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the
body levying the same.159
The other is article XI, section 12:
The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties,
cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants
or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal pur-
poses, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities
thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.
158 REV. STAT. § 5219 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1952).
157 Wash. Laws 1929, c. 151.
258 Aberdeen Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536, 290 Pac.
697 (1930); Burr, Conrad & Broom, Inc. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 393, 289 Pac. 551
(1930). The most recent attempt was, similarly, futile; Wash. Laws 1951 Ex. Sess.,
c. 10, 7(b), held invalid, for various reasons, in Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191,
235 P.2d 173 .(1951).
159 The second sentence only of this section is quoted in the text. The first sentence
relates to local improvements and assessments or special taxes to defray the cost
thereof.
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These sections, which are complementary, embody two distinct pre-
cepts. One is definitive of the taxing power which may be enjoyed by
local subdivisions of government; the other is a restriction upon the
power of the state legislature.
Both sections indicate that counties, cities, and other subdivisions of
the state, however designated, have no inherent power of taxation.
These sections, however, make it clear that the legislature may grant
the taxing power to such subdivisions of the state, subject to stated
restrictions.' The restrictions applicable to a legislative grant of
taxing power to a subdivision are dual in character. Under section
twelve, the taxing power may be granted to counties, cities, towns, or
other municipal corporations for county, city, town, or other municipal
purposes. In section nine, the same restriction is phrased in the term
"for all corporate purposes.'. The other requirement, stated in sec-
tion nine only, is that all taxes assessed and collected pursuant to such
delegated authority "shall be uniform in respect to persons and prop-
erty within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same." This con-
stitutional requirement is implicit in every legislative delegation of
taxing power to municipalities or other subdivisions of the state and
applies, as well, to the provisions of the legislative act under which the
power is granted.' The court has had few occasions to discuss the
meaning of "uniformity" under this constitutional provision. It obvi-
ously requires geographic uniformity.' This means that a tax which
a county is authorized to levy must apply alike to all persons or prop-
erty within the geographic limits of the county, and a city tax must
apply alike to all within the geographic limits of the city.
From the aspect of classification of the subjects of local taxation, the
effect of the uniformity requirement of section nine is not the same in
the case of local taxes on property as in the case of local taxes other
than property taxes. As applied to property taxes which local subdivi-
160 State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac. 961 (1904) ; Great Northern Ry. v. Glover,
194 Wash. 146, 77 P.2d 598 (1938) ; Great Northern Ry. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash.
238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919) ; State ex rel. School Dist. v. Clark County, 177 Wash. 314,
31 P.2d 897 (1934) ; Pacific First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Pierce County, 27
Wn.2d 347, 178 P.2d 351 (1947).
1#1 State cx rel. Latimer v. Henry, 28 Wash. 38, 68 Pac. 368 (1902) (county);
Denman v. Tacoma, 170 Wash. 406, 16 P.2d 596 (1932) (city); Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. Roessler, 2 Wn.2d 304, 97 P.2d 1070 (1940) (county).
11,2 State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac. 961 (1904).
10 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises ... ; but all duties, imposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." The similarity between the latter
provision and the language of § 9 is marked. The federal courts have consistently held
that geographic uniformity is required under this constitutional language.
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sions are empowered to levy, the "uniformity" required is that stated
in section 1, article VII, because this section obviously applies to all
taxes on property, whether levied by the state for state purposes or by
a county, city, school district, or other subdivision for local purposes.
This is taken for granted without discussion in all the cases interpreting
the uniformity requirement of section one. But as to taxes on per-
sons," 4 which are also within the contemplation of section nine, uni-
formity permits any reasonable classification of the subjects of taxa-
tion. It should mean the same *as, and no more than, equal protection
of the laws. One case so holds."'
Under these constitutional provisions, the legislature, in addition to
withholding the power to levy and collect any particular type of tax
for local purposes, may attach conditions and restrictions with respect
to the taxing authority granted.' The extent of the taxing power to
be enjoyed by municipalities and other subdivisions of the state is,
consequently, entirely at the discretion of the legislature. It may grant,
or it may withhold. It is clear, moreover, that this legislative discretion
extends to taxes upon persons as well as to taxes upon property.
6 7
The second aspect of these provisions 6 is a restriction on the taxing
power of the legislature. The legislature is forbidden "to impose taxes
... upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon
the inhabitants or property thereof ... for county, city, town, or other
municipal purposes." There are three requirements for application of
the provision: (1) imposition of a tax, (2) application to a protected
entity, and (3) imposition for a local purpose.
The entities protected are of three types. First are the counties,
cities, towns, and other municipal corporations as such. Second are
the inhabitants of counties and of the several types of municipal cor-
porations. The residents of a local subdivision, as well as the govern-
mental unit itself, are, thus, in the protected class. The third object in
the protected class is "the property thereof." Without discussion, this
164 This is the wording of § 9. It undoubtedly connotes all species of taxes other
than taxes on property within the meaning of § 1.
165 Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907).
160 Great Northern Ry. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash. 238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919);
State ex reL. King County v. State Tax Comm'n., 174 Wash. 668, 26 P.2d 80 (1933);
State ex rel. School Dist. v. Clark County, 177 Wash. 314, 31 P.2d 897 ,(1934).
"17 This is implicit in the clause requiring uniformity "in respect to persons and
property." For examples of taxes on persons, see State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac.
961 (1904) and Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907). The legislative
practice has been to grant power to cities, in particular, to levy license taxes and cer-
tain excise taxes. This practice has not been challenged.
168 In WAsHa. CoNsT. art. XI, § 12.
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has been construed to mean the property of inhabitants,' although
this is grammatically a questionable construction of the statutory lan-
guage.1
The second requirement for application of the constitutional pro-
scription is that the tax be for a county, city, town or other municipal
purpose. If a tax imposed by the state legislature is solely for a state
purpose, rather than for a local purpose, the constitutional prohibition
does not apply.' But whether the purpose which the tax serves is
solely a state purpose, solely a local purpose, or a purpose of both the
state and the local subdivision is not always readily apparent." 2 If the
purpose served is a combined one, having both local and state aspects,
does the constitutional provision apply? Legislative acts relating to
taxes for the support of the common schools have brought this question
squarely before the court. Newman v. Schlarbl7" involved a state
statute which required each county to apply a specified amount out of
the county-levied property tax to the support of the common schools
in the county. In a departmental decision, the court unanimously held
that the tax was for a state purpose with local benefits to the county,
not "upon the county for county purposes," and thus not in conflict
with article XI, section 12.174 Thus, where the tax serves a clear and
160 This is implicit in all cases involving property taxes. State ex rel. State Tax
Comm'n. v Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932), State ex rel. Tacoma School
Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d 638 (1934) and Clark v. Seiber, 48 Wn.2d 783,
296 P.2d 680 (1956), among others, are illustrative.
170 The question is whether the word "thereof" following the word "property"
relates back to the primary subject, "counties, cities," etc., or relates back to the word
"inhabitants." The word "thereof" must modify the word "inhabitants" in order to
make it meaningful; in so doing, it necessarily relates back to the antecedent "counties,
cities," etc. As a modifier of the word "property," it should have the same meaning.
Grammatically, therefore, the word "property" in § 12 refers to the property of coun-
ties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations and not to the property of inhabit-
ants of counties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations. Under this grammatical
construction, however, § 12 would duplicate the constitutional exemption of "the prop-
erty of counties, school districts and other municipal corporations" in art. VII, § 1.
The court, had it considered the problem, could readily have reached the conclusion
that, although the draftsmen of the constitution were inept in the art of English com-
position, the intent to denote the property of inhabitants, rather than the property of
counties, cities, etc. only, is sufficiently indicated to warrant disregard of the normal
rules of construction.
171 Nipges v. Thornton, 119 Wash. 464, 206 Pac. 17 (1922). This proposition is
either implicitly or expressly recognized in all of the cases here mentioned.
172 As the counties, cities, districts, and other subdivisions are but parts of the state,
created to perform some of the sovereign functions of the state, it may be said that
everything done locally serves both a local and a state purpose.
173 184 Wash. 147, 50 P.2d 36 (1935).
17
4 WASH. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 1 and 2, which make education a "paramount duty
of the state" and require the legislature to provide a uniform system of public schools
throughout the state, were relied upon to establish the state purpose of the tax involved
in the statute.
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substantial state purpose, the local purpose requirement of section
twelve is not met even though there are, at the same time, local benefits.
But in the more recent case of Clark v. Seiber,175 three judges, after
pointing out that operation of the common schools is not solely a state
purpose, but in part a local purpose, concluded that the Ryder Act'
was invalid under section twelve. These judges thus took the position
that, if the purpose served is a combination state and local purpose, the
constitutional requirement of local purpose is thereby met. They also
apparently believed that when there is a combination purpose it will be
regarded as a local purpose unless the legislature, in some unexplained
manner, demonstrates the proportion of the whole which is "state
purpose." The other six judges, however, did not agree with this, but
adhered to the reasoning of the court in Newman v. Schlarb."' When
a combination state and local purpose is served, as in the case of oper-
ation of the common schools, the majority of the members of the court
will, apparently, sustain the legislative act as one having a state pur-
pose. But what standard the court will use in determining, under this
section, the "purpose" of other and differing acts, the opinions ren-
dered up to this time do not reveal.
The existence of both a state and a local purpose also appears to be
the basis upon which the court, in State ex rel. Board of Commissioners
v. Clausen,' sustained an act' which required Pierce County, alone,
to levy a tax on property in that county for the purpose of financing
the purchase of land in that county, which land was to be deeded to the
United States for a military training camp and supply station. In a
rambling opinion, which cites and quotes from a number of cases in
other states without noting whether the constitutions of the other states
contained a provision similar to article XI, section 12, and cites and
quotes from earlier Washington cases without distinguishing between
mandatory and permissive acts or acts involving taxes and assessments
for local improvements, the court sustained the act. After stating that
acquisition and transfer of land to the federal government for military
17 48 Wn.2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956).
276 Wash. Laws 1955, c. 253. This act required that the assessed valuation of prop-
erty as equalized by the state board of equalization, rather than the assessed valuations
determined by the county assessor and equalized by the county board of equalization,
be used as the base for the levy of taxes on property for school district purposes.
177 The Ryder Act was held invalid, however, by a vote of 5 to 4. Two of the judges
concurred with the three judges referred to in the text, but based their decision wholly
on conflict with another section of the state constitution. Four judges voted to uphold
the act, and expressly relied upon he reasoning in Newman v. Schlarb.
178 95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744 (1917).
179 Wash. Laws 1917, c. 3.
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purposes is a proper exercise of the sovereign power of the state, the
court came to the highly questionable conclusion that a single county,
as an agency of the state, can be required to perform this function and
be required to levy taxes on property within that county only for the
purpose of financing the project. It is submitted that, if this tax is for
a county purpose, the holding flagrantly disregards the obvious intent
and purpose of article XI, section 12. It is a tax levied by the state
legislature on property of inhabitants of the county for a purely local
purpose, which meets all three of the requirements for application of
the section. On the other hand, if solely a state purpose is involved, its
cost should be borne by the entire state, not by a single county.
Although not violative of article XI, section 12, a tax on the property
in one county only for a state purpose should have been regarded as
violative of the uniformity requirement of article VII,8° because, as a
tax for state purposes, it is not imposed alike on all property in the
state and thus lacks geographic uniformity. The court, however, was
equally cavalier in its treatment of this constitutional objection to the
act.
Nipges v. Thornton... is another case which involves the "purpose"
requirement of the section. 2 The statute in question levied a poll tax.
It was applicable throughout the state. The duty of collecting the tax
and remitting eighty per cent of the proceeds to the state treasurer was
placed upon a designated county officer. The statute further provided
that twenty per cent of the amount collected was to be retained and
put into the county expense fund. The court held that this was a tax
for state, not county, purposes as to the twenty per cent retained, as
well as to the eighty per cent remitted to the state. Although there was
nothing in the opinion to indicate how closely the retained percentage
correspond with the actual costs of collection incurred by the county,
the court held that the retained portion of the collections was not a tax
imposed by the state for county purposes but was a reasonable method
of reimbursing the county for acting as collector of state taxes.
From the cases reviewed, it is apparent that the court has been
strongly inclined to find a state purpose, rather than a local purpose,
in the acts which have been presented for its consideration. The inter-
180 At the time of this decision the general uniformity provision with respect to
property taxes was in WAsH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2 (1889).
11 119 Wash. 464, 206 Pac. 17 (1922).
182 In this case the other two requirements for application of the section were clearly
present. It was a tax and it was imposed by the state legislature. Being applicable
throughout the state it was upon the inhabitants of the counties.
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twining character of both the activities and the fiscal problems of the
state and its subdivisions would seem fully to justify this approach.
As previously stated, the three requirements for application of sec-
tion twelve are that the legislative act (1) impose a tax (2) for a local
purpose (3) upon a protected entity. The requirement here first
stated, imposition of a tax, is the last of the three to be considered.
Whether the legislative act involves a tax or some other type of,
burden is the first problem under this requirement. An ad valorem
property tax is such a tax, but a special assessment, or a special tax, for
benefits accruing from a public improvement, the amount of which
burden is determined by the benefits conferred and not by the value
of the property, is not a tax within the meaning of this section.' 8 ' A
poll tax is a tax within the meaning of this section, 8" and, although the
court has not had occasion to consider the question, it seems apparent
that this is also true with respect to all types of taxes which are
commonly designated as excise or privilege taxes. A statute which
requires a county or city to incur expense, which may have the prac-
tical effect of increasing taxes in the local subdivision, does not consti-
tute the imposition of a tax within the meaning of the section if the
statute does not legally require taxes.8 5
The second aspect of this requirement is whether the state legis-
lature has imposed a tax. Here, the issue is whether the legislature
has merely authorized the appropriate authorities of the local sub-
division to determine whether a tax shall be levied and collected or
whether the legislature itself has made that determination without
opportunity on the part of the local authorities to exercise discretion
as to whether the tax shall be imposed in the particular municipality
or other subdivision. This section is frequently referred to as a "home
rule" provision, because its apparent purpose is to permit the legis-
lature to authorize, but to bar the legislature from requiring, the levy
and collection of any particular tax by any local governmental unit.
The distinguishing characteristic of "discretion" or the lack of it
on the part of local authorities is well illustrated in three cases involv-
ing local improvement guaranty funds prescribed by the legislature.
183 Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911); State ex rel. Conner v.
Superior Court, 81 Wash. 480, 143 Pac. 112 (1914).
184 Nipges v. Thornton, 119 Wash. 464, 206 Pac. 17 (1922).
185 Hindman v. Boyd, 42 Wash. 17, 84 Pac. 609 (1906) (election expense) ; State
ex rel. Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639 (1911) (act requiring local sub-
divisions to maintain a uniform system of accounts); State v. Pierce County, 132
Wash. 155, 231 Pac. 801 (1925) (act requiring county to pay to the state the cost of
maintaining, in a state institution, certain patients committed from the county).
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In Hallaan v. Port Angeles 86 a statute required cities to establish a
fund to guarantee payment of local improvement bonds and interest
and required annual tax levies for the guaranty fund. This was held
valid under section twelve as applied to a local improvement authorized
subsequent to the time the statute was enacted, because the tax required
for the guaranty fund is not imposed by the legislature but is merely
a condition attached to the power granted to the city. The tax is, thus,
imposed by the local authority, not by the legislature. The local
authorities could either authorize the local improvement with the
attendant necessity of making the required tax levy for the guaranty
fund, or they could refuse to make the improvement, thus avoiding the
levy of the tax. In other words, a requirement that a tax be levied for
a local purpose may be attached as a condition to an action which the
city is authorized, but not required, to take. If the city authorities
decide to take the action, the attendant tax levy is not imposed by the
legislature within the meaning of this section. By taking the permitted
action, the city, not the legislature, imposes the tax. This clearly
illustrates that the legislature has great latitude with respect to the
conditions which it may attach to the powers it grants to the subdivi-
sions of the state.
On the other hand, statutes which require tax levies to finance a
guaranty fund to protect the holders of bonds authorized and issued
prior to the enactment of the state guaranty fund act constitute legis-
lative imposition of a tax within the meaning of this section. The tax
levies so required were directed by the legislature without opportunity
for the local authorities to determine whether or not the tax burden
should be locally imposed. "7
Legislative enactments relating to assessment procedures and deter-
mination of the base upon which property taxes are levied by the
,.ounties, cities, and other municipal corporations (particularly school
districts) have been a major source of litigation under this section.
There is no doubt that the taxes involved in th6 several statutes meet
two of the requirements for application of section twelve. Except in
Clark v. Seiber,8" the property taxes involved were for strictly local
purposes. As each statute related to taxes on the property, real or
personal, of inhabitants of counties, cities, school districts, or other
186 161 Wash. 353, 297 Pac. 149 (1931).
187 Longview Co. v. Lynn, 6 ,Vn.2d 507, 108 P.2d 365 (1940) ; State ex rel Wash.
Mfut. Say. Bank v. Bellingham, 8 Wn.2d 233, 111 P.2d 781 (1941).
18848 Wn.2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956).
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municipal corporations, the taxes to which these statutes related were
upon objects within the protection of the constitutional provision. The
problem in each case was whether the particular statutory provisions
constituted legislative imposition of a tax. Involving ad valorem prop-
erty taxes in each instance, each statute concerned what is admittedly
a "tax" within the meaning of this clause. The sole question for con-
sideration by the court in each case.8 was thus whether, under the act
in question, a tax was imposed by the legislature. In some, but not all,
of the cases, the court held that statutory provisions which related
solely to matters concerning the tax base; that is, the assessed valua-
tion of property, constituted an unconstitutional imposition of tax by
the legislature. In each instance, the challenged act had nothing what-
ever to do with the levy of the tax. Whether or not a tax was to be
levied or imposed upon the tax base as determined and the rate at
which it was to be levied was solely within the control of the local
authorities, subject of course, to the rate limitations established either
by initiative measure or the constitutional provision previously men-
tioned.
The leading case is State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. Redd."'
It involved an act which authorized the state tax commission, upon
receipt of a protest and after a hearing thereon, to relist and revalue
property in a county and required that the tax levies, for county and
other local purposes and at millage rates determined solely by the
appropriate county authorities, be applied to the assessed valuations
as revised by the tax commission pursuant to the provisions of the act.
The challenged act, thus, related solely to the tax base and in no way
related to or infringed upon the power of the local authorities to
determine whether a tax was to be imposed or the rate at which it was
to be imposed. The court held that this act was violative of article XI,
section 12, stating: "If the local authorities only, as we hold, have the
power to list and value property within the county for local taxation
purposes, no other authorities can legally relist and revalue that
property for local taxation purposes." " ' The process by which the
court reached the conclusion that only the local authorities have power
to list and value property within the county for local tax purposes is
189 Clark v. Seiber, 48 Wn.2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956) is an exception. As previ-
ously pointed out this case also involved the aspect of state or local purpose.
190 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932). The opinion in this case contains a number
of statements relating to constitutional requirements for which there is no apparent
foundation in that document.
191 Id. at 147, 6 P.2d at 625.
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far from clear. The conclusion appears to be based more upon con-
sideration of statutory provisions, other than those in the act in ques-
tion, relating to property taxation than it does upon the wording of the
constitutional provision. The statutory provisions for state assessment
of the operating properties of railroads in more than one county were
approved on the basis that they promoted the uniform application of
the tax laws." 2 The fact that the legislature, in the act considered in
the Redd case, as well as in the act directing assessment of inter-county
operating properties of utilities, was seeking to attain the uniformity
and equality of property taxes demanded by the constitution.9
received no consideration by the court. Neither did the court satis-
factorily explain why assessment of inter-county utility properties was
any less an imposition of taxes by the legislature within the meaning
of article XI, section 12, than was the relisting and revaluation of
property in the county. Since both were done for the purpose of pro-
viding the base for the county levy, it is difficult to discern the differ-
ence.
The court has upheld a statute which (1) authorizes the state board
of equalization to value the operating properties of public service
companies situated in more than one county of the state and (2)
requires the counties to utilize the assessed valuations determined by
the state board as the base upon which the local subdivisions are
authorized to levy property tax. To require the county to utilize the
state board's valuation of the operating property of a utility which is
wholly within one county would, however, violate this constitutional
provision, constituting an invalid "imposition" of a tax." 4 The court
has also held that a statute abolishing the office of township assessor
and the town board of review and vesting the power to make assess-
ments and to review them in the county assessor and county board of
equalization is not a violation of this section. 5
In another case the court held that the directors of a school district
cannot, on their own volition, utilize as the base for the school district
levy, the valuation of property in the district as equalized by the state
board of equalization for state tax purposes. The school district was
102 Id. at 154, 6 P.2d at 627.
193 VAsH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2 (1889).
104 Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P.2d 1083
(1935). See also State ex reL Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash.
179, 73 P.2d 759 (1937) (original assessment by state tax commission of property
wholly within a county prohibited by the section).
195 Opportunity Township v. Kingsland, 194 Wash. 229, 77 P.2d 793 (1938).
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thus required to use the valuations as determined by the county
assessor."' In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon article
XI, section 12, stating:
It seems clear to us that to permit the appellant to make its levy on
the basis of the valuation fixed by the state board of equalization
would, in effect, amount to an imposition of taxes by the legislature
"cupon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations" for local
purposes.
197
It may be amusing to speculate why the legislature would, "in effect"
or otherwise, impose a tax for local purposes if the school directors
were permitted voluntarily to select one, rather than the other, of two
assessed valuations, each fixed pursuant to statute by an officer or
agency of a governmental unit separate and distinct from the school
district. The court did not offer any explanation. Twenty-two years
later, after extensive study by the Legislative Council of the tax
imbroglio affecting all levels of government in the state and with a much
more widespread understanding of the interrelation of state and local
fiscal problems, the legislature tried again. This time, however, the
statute required school districts to utilize valuations determined by the
state board of equalization as the base to which the levy, at the rate
determined by the directors of the district, was to be applied. This time
only three members of the court believed that article XI, section 12,
was violated by the legislative mandate that the state board's equalized
valuations be used as the base for school district levies. The other six
judges apparently all believed (four joined in a dissenting opinion
expressly so stating) that this section was not violated, even though
use of the state board's valuations was mandatory. The act, however,
was held invalid because two of the latter six judges held it conflicted
with another provision of the state constitution.'
It is difficult to understand why legislative selection of the agency to
perform the purely administrative function of assessment, that is, of
determining the factual issue of valuation of property, constitutes
"imposition" of a tax by the legislature in some instances' but not in
198 State ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d 638 (1934).
197 Id. at 692, 30 P.2d at 639.
198 Clark v. Seiber, 48 Wn.2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956). The two judges who voted
to invalidate the act under another section did not join in the opinion of the three who
voted invalidity under art. XI, § 12.
'99 State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6P.2d 619 (1932) (revi-
sion by state tax commission of valuations determined by the county assessor) ; State
ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d 638 (1934) (optional
utilization by school directors of valuations determined by state board of equalization
in preference to valuations determined by county assessor) ; Northwestern Improve-
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others.'"0 Why does administrative determination of a fact constitute
a prohibited legislative imposition of tax in one case and not in another?
The cases fail to reveal any rational basis for the differing results.
Certainly the differences are not required by the constitutional lan-
guage.
It is also difficult to understand why the legislature has the power to
attach conditions to the grant of power in some instances-even to the
extent of imposing a condition that a tax must be levied, as in Hallahan
v. Port Angeles,"1 as an incident to the exercise of a power granted to
a local subdivision-but, in some but not all instances, is constitution-
ally barred from designating the agency to perform an administrative
function which is merely preliminary to the legislative function of
levying the tax. The constitutional language does not state that the
distinct functions of assessment and levy are inseparable. The language
is permissive. The legislature may grant the power to assess, and it
may grant the power to collect. In fact, the word "levy" does not
appear in the constitutional provision. A statute transferring the
administrative function of assessment of all property from the county
assessors to the state tax commission and requiring the counties and
other municipal subdivisions to utilize the assessed values determined
by the state agency should no more be in conflict with the language of
article XI, section 12, than was the statute in Opportunity Township v.
Kingsland, "2 which transferred the assessment function from the town-
ship assessor to the county assessor without disturbing the existing
delegation of the levy power to the township authorities.
The constitution does not prohibit separation of the two distinct
functions of assessment and of power to levy taxes. This has been
expressly recognized in the case of township property and in the case
of inter-county operating properties of utilities. Legislative designation
ment Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P.2d 1083 (1935) (utilization of valuations
of public utility properties by state tax commission, when the properties are situated
in one county, but not when operating properties are in two or more counties) ; State
ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179, 73 P.2d 759 (1937)
(utilization of valuations determined by the state tax commission in preference to
valuations determined by the county assessor).
200 Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P.2d 1083
(1935) (valuations of public utility operating properties situated in two or more
counties of the state) ; Opportunity Township v. Kingsland, 194 Wash. 229, 77 P.2d
793 (1938) (valuation of properties in a township by the county assessor, in prefer-
ence to valuations by township assessor) ; State ex rel. King County v. State Tax
Comm'n., 174 Wash. 668, 26 P.2d 80 (1933) (valuations determined by the state tax
commission, in preference to valuations fixed by county board of equalization, under
statute authorizing appeals from the county board to the state commission).
201 161 Wash. 353, 297 Pac. 149 (1931).
202 194 Wash. 229, 77 P.2d 793 (1938).
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of a county officer, the county assessor, as the appropriate agency to
determine the assessed valuation of property for the purposes of city
school districts °. and various other taxing districts has been consist-
ently accepted. Selection of the officer or agency to perform the
administrative function of assessment must be a matter for determina-
tion by the legislature in all, not just in some, situations, because the
constitution itself draws no such lines of demarcation. It is submitted
that a judicial construction of the constitutional language which
imposes restrictions, not expressly and clearly stated in the constitution,
upon the legislature's power to determine policies in this area consti-
tutes an encroachment upon the powers of the legislature, contrary to
the doctrine of separation of powers, which is the foundation of our
form of constitutional government.
Article two, section forty: dedication of taxes to highway purposes.
Another type of constitutional restriction on legislative discretion with
respect to state fiscal policy is found in amendment eighteen.' 4 The
first sentence of this provision reads as follows:
All fees collected by the State of Washington as license fees for
motor vehicles and all excise taxes collected by the State of Washing-
ton on the sale, distribution or use of motor vehicle fuel and all other
state revenue intended to be used for highway purposes, shall be paid
into the state treasury and placed in a special fund to be used exclu-
sively for highway purposes.
The second sentence contains a detailed specification of items to be
included under the term "highway purposes" and concludes with a
proviso which reads as follows:
Provided, That this section shall not be construed to include
revenue from general or special taxes or excises not levied primarily
for highway purposes, or apply to vehicle operator's license fees or any
excise tax imposed on motor vehicles or the use thereof in lieu of
property tax thereon, or fees for certificates of ownership of motor
vehicles.
While the legislature still has the right to determine whether motor
vehicle license fees or excise taxes on the sale, distribution, or use of
motor vehicle fuel shall be levied by the state and still has discretion
with respect to the amount of such fees and excise taxes to be collected,
203 Express approval is implicit in Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 P.2d 36
(1935), and State ex tel. Tacoma School Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d 638
(1934).
204 This amendment, approved in 1944, adds to art. II of the state constitution a new
section, numbered 40.
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this constitutional provision makes it mandatory that the entire amount
of these fees and excise taxes be devoted exclusively to highway pur-
poses. No part of such fees or excise taxes collected by the state can
be utilized to defray other costs of government. Thus, although those
who purchase at retail or use articles of tangible personal property
other than motor vehicle fuel make a contribution to the general costs
of state government at the time of making such purchase or use, the
entire tax contributions of purchasers and users of motor vehicle fuel
are constitutionally dedicated to one special purpose. Equal contribu-
tion to the general costs of state government by reason of such pur-
chase or use is constitutionally forbidden. Conceding that motor
vehicle license fees and taxes on motor vehicle fuel are not only an
effective but a most appropriate method of obtaining funds to cover
the cost of building and maintaining highways and that these taxes
most fairly distribute such costs among those who derive special
benefits from the use of the highways, the policy of dedication of all
revenue from these sources may very well be open to question in a
state which relies so extensively on sales and use taxes for the support
of state government in general. The majority of the voters, however,
accepted this policy.
What constitutes "other state revenue intended to be used for high-
way purposes" within the meaning of the first sentence and "revenue
from general or special taxes or excises not levied primarily for highway
purposes" within the meaning of the first clause of the proviso may be
productive of future controversy. Does legislative intent control? In
the absence of an express legislative statement that the proceeds of a
particular tax are for highway purposes, is the constitutional provision
applicable? Or must the legislature negative such intent? And, if it
does state a negative intent, will the court review that statement and
make its own independent determination? When is a tax "primarily"
levied for highway purposes? These, and other unanswered questions,
must receive legislative consideration in formulating a tax program for
the state.
Another problem is whether this constitutional dedication, particu-
larly with respect to taxes on the sale or use of motor vehicle fuel, is
applicable only to such taxes levied by the state, as opposed to the
counties, cities, or other sudivisions of the state. As the constitutional
provision contains the modifying words "collected by the State of
Washington," it appears that the only tax proceeds subject to the
19581
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constitutional dedication are those levied by the state itself. The
legislature, consequently, may authorize the counties, cities, school
districts, or other subdivisions to levy taxes on the sale or use of motor
vehicle fuel for local purposes, freed from dedication to highway pur-
poses, unless, of course, the words "State of Washington" are inter-
pretedto have the most unusual, and unlikely, connotation of including
the local subdivisions as well as the state itself.
III
The preceding sections of this paper have explored a number of
inter-related problems confronting the legislature and the people of the
state in planning for state and local government over the next decade.
The probabilities of significant changes have been noted, particularly
those that will substantially increase the proportion of personal income
required for the support of the state and local government. The
proportions of these future needs add unavoidable urgency. Dif-
ficult and perplexing issues of public policy must be resolved,
and resolved in the proximate future, to avoid a compounding
of problems that would make sound solutions all the more elusive.
Taken together, the forces at work shape issues in three major areas.
First, in designing the ways by which the economic capacities of the
state can most equitably be reached for the support of state and local
government, what scope of action is available ot the legislature?
Second, in strengthening the effectiveness of public services, to assure
fair value in services for fiscal support exacted, can the legislature
take the steps that are indicated? Third, in bringing present day
methods to bear upon the utilization of fiscal resources, can the legis-
lature act with reasonable flexibility? The present situation with
respect to each of these areas will now be summarized.
CONSTITUTIONAL LmITATIONS ON TAXATION
Taxes on property. In the case of taxes on property, the constitu-
tional restrictions which confront the legislature are many and varied
in character. Some relate to the tax levy, some to assessment pro-
cedures.
The maximum property tax levy for state and local purposes speci-
fied under amendment seventeen of the constitution is fixed and, in so
far as the legislature is concerned, practically inflexible. The legisla-
ture may determine the maximum rate of levy by the state and by each
of the several types of local subdivisions except port and power dis-
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tricts. The aggregate of the several levies by the state, the county, the
city, the school district, and the other taxing districts, however, cannot
exceed the constitutional forty mills on a theoretical assessed valuation
of fifty per cent of true and fair value in money. By vote of the people
in any taxing district, additional levies may be made. The constitu-
tional requirements, however, are stringent. For current operations,
such additional levies can be for one year only. Bonded indebtedness
for capital improvements only can be authorized by vote of the people
with attendant additional tax levies over a period of years to pay the
principal and the interest on such indebtedness. In both instances,
however, the additional levy must be approved by sixty per cent of
those voting on the proposition, and at least forty (in some districts,
by statute, fifty) per cent of those who voted in the taxing district at
the last general election must cast votes on the proposition. This means
that, by merely staying away from the polling booth, an elector in
effect casts a negative vote on the proposition.
With respect to assessment, amendment seventeen stipulates that all
property subject to taxation shall be assessed at fifty per cent of its
true and fair value in money. A number of studies of assessed valua-
tions as determined by county assessors and equalized by county boards
of equalization have shown, beyond all doubt, that the constitutional
level of fifty per cent of true value is, on the average, never attained.
These studies show that the actual ratio of assessed value to sales
price of single properties varies from an approximate maximum of ten
times the sale price to an approximate minimum of three-tenths of one
per cent of such sale price. They also show that the average ratios of
assessed valuations to sale in the several counties vary from a low of
13.3 per cent to a high of 38.5 per cent. With these deficiencies in the
existing procedures of assessment well known, the so-called "home
rule" provision of the state constitution has been construed by the
court to frustrate every effort by the legislature to establish effective
procedures to attain what the constitution demands; namely, uniform
taxation of all property in the state at the constitutionally prescribed
percentage of its true and fair value in money. The frustration of
these legislative efforts has been justified, apparently, on the theory
that the level of assessed valuation of property for local tax purposes
is purely a matter of local concern. This disregards two most important
facts of which the legislature, but apparently not the court, is cognizant.
The first is that uniformity of taxation, demanded by the constitution,
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as between different classes of property does not exist, either within the
boundaries of each separate county or as between the several counties.
The second is that varying ratios of assessment in the several counties
produce lack of uniformity of taxation throughout the state. This is
true because, with constitutionally prescribed millage limitations and
below-constitutionally prescribed property valuations combining to
produce in the several local subdivisions less than enough to pay for
the services demanded by the electors, the state has been forced to
assume more and more of the costs of functions formerly financed by
local property tax levies. The over-all consequence is a premium upon
disregard of the constitutionally prescribed assessment ratio, because
the counties assessing at the lowest ratios thereby succeed in shifting
the greatest portion of the cost of their own local government to tax-
payers in other parts of the state.
No one questions the proposition that property owners must bear a
fair share of the cost of government. Neither is it seriously questioned
that the property tax is a suitable instrument-probably the most
suitable-for financing the cost of government in the local subdivisions.
But it is also beyond question that the Washington legislature is im-
paled on the horns of a constitutional dilemma. Between the constitu-
tionally fixed maximum levy and the judicially construed lack of
legislative power to establish effective assessment procedures, the
hands of the legislature are effectively tied. The solutions appear to
lie in these alternatives. The first is either upward revision or com-
plete elimination of the constitutional levy limitation. The second
alternative is double-pronged. One approach would be to amend the
"home rule" provision of the constitution to clearly permit effective
legislative determination of assessment procedures for all purposes.
The other is for the court to take a more realistic approach, reappraise
its holdings, and retreat from the construction which has operated to
defeat legislative efforts to attain uniformity in the actual application
of the property tax throughout the state. Under either of these, the
legislature must have complete power to fix the policies and the pro-
cedures through which it seeks to attain, in actual operation, uniformity
to the full extent possible under modern procedures of tax administra-
tion-not just theoretical uniformity or a level of uniformity which
meets the minimum legal standards thereof.
Intangibles. Taxation of intangibles as property on an ad valorem
basis is frequently suggested, either as a supplement to the property
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tax on real estate and tangible personal property or as an alternative
to a tax on income from such intangibles. There is no doubt that
intangible personal property represents a very substantial portion of
the total wealth of individuals and, to a lesser extent, of corporations
in this state. Intangible personal property includes bank deposits, cor-
porate stocks, bonds, notes, other evidences of indebtedness, beneficial
interests under trusts, and various other types of rights or claims. The
taxation of this type of wealth under the ad valorem property tax is, in
this state, subject to some specific constitutional restrictions. The
taxation of some, but not all, such property is constitutionally barred.
The difficulties of determining the types of credits which are constitu-
tionally exempt and separating them from those which may constitu-
tionally be taxed, present formidable, if not insurmountable, difficulties
from the legislative standpoint, as well as from the standpoint of tax
administration. These difficulties appear to be so great that, in this
state, taxation of all credits appears to be, for all practical purposes,
forbidden. This being the constitutional and administrative situation,
it seems unnecessary to consider here the serious questions of admin-
istrative feasibility of such a tax when it is constitutionally permissible
to tax credits of every kind.
Income taxes. A tax on the income of individuals and corporations
can take any one of several forms. The most common form of per-
sonal income tax is the tax on net income of individuals, with graduated
rates and exemptions varying in amount upon the basis of the marital
status and number of dependents. By classifying such a tax as a tax on
property within the meaning of the state constitution, article seven, the
supreme court of this state has effectively and consistently blocked a
personal net income tax with graduated rates and varying personal
exemptions. Although the holding is unique in this country, a cor-
porate franchise tax measured by net income, without graduation in
rates and without exemptions, is also invalid when no state tax is
levied on the net income of individuals and partnerships. Notwith-
standing almost universal recognition of the essential fairness of the
graduated personal net income tax, as opposed to consumption taxes
and taxes measured by gross income, and wide-spread acceptance of
net income as the most appropriate measure of a corporate franchise
tax, taxation of the net income of either individuals or corporations in
the manner such income is taxed by approximately two-thirds of the
states is prohibited. Amendment of the state constitution expressly to
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authorize taxation of the net income of individuals and corporations is
without doubt the only means of making it possible for the legislature
or the people effectively to impose such a tax.
Without such amendment, legislative effort to construct an effective
tax on net income conforming with existing constitutional restrictions
seems futile. When a tax on, or measured by, net income is treated as
a tax on property, as it has been by the Washington court, it is subject
not only to the uniformity and limited classification requirements of
article VII, section 1 (amendment fourteen) but also to the forty-mill
limitation of section 2 (amendment seventeen). How the forty-mill
limitation would operate on a net income tax is not altogether clear.
If the taxable net income, as computed, is treated as the property
taxed, the forty-mill limitation would appear to impose a maximum
rate of two per cent of such computed taxable net income. A further
question would be whether the state could impose the tax at a flat rate
of not to exceed two per cent or whether the computed taxable net
income would have to be extended on the property tax assessment rolls
and be subject to the levies for the state, the county, the city, the school
district, and so forth, the same as real and tangible personal property.
It would appear that, being personal property, net income could, under
section one, be put into a class separate and distinct from other personal
property and be taxed only by the state if the legislature so desired.
This being permissible, under amendment seventeen the state could
levy, for state purposes, the maximum permissible rate if all local
subdivisions were barred from applying their property tax levies to
this class of property.
However, it is possible the court might say that the tax imposed is,
in effect, a tax on the property from which the taxable net income is
derived, rather than a tax on the computed net income itself as prop-
erty. The court has taken a similar position in the case of net income
from real estate, saying that a net income tax on rent from real estate
is a tax on the real estate from which the rent is derived. So treated, the
maximum amount of tax permissible would have to be computed on
the basis of the assessed valuation of the property from which the net
income was derived, rather than by applying the rate limitation to the
net income itself. As a very high percentage of personal property from
which income is derived-all credits, for example-are not assessed for
property tax purposes, such a construction would inject so many com-
plexities that a property tax on net income would be infeasible from
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an administrative standpoint, if not constitutionally barred because of
unpredictable variations in its impact. Just how this theory would
operate in the case of income derived from personal services is conjec-
tural to the nth degree. In fact, this aspect shows how impractical and
unrealistic, from the standpoint of effective fiscal planning, are the
basic premises which cause this type of futile theorizing to be necessary.
Summarizing, it would seem that, without a constitutional amend-
ment specifically authorizing a tax on net income, the legislature may
possibly, but far from surely, have the power to levy a tax on net
income from personal services and personal property, tangible and in-
tangible, but excluding income from real estate. There could be no
variation in the deduction for personal exemption. The tax must be
levied at a flat rate. The amount of the tax could not exceed two per
cent of the computed taxable net income if the court construed the tax
as one on the net income itself. If the court construed the tax as one
on the property from which the net income is derived, a tax on net
income, even so restricted, would be either impractical because of
administrative complexities or constitutionally barred because of its
haphazard impact-or both.
Another form of income tax is one which utilizes gross income,
rather than net income, as the measure of the tax. In sustaining the
state business and occupation tax upon persons, firms and corporations
engaging in business activities, the court approved a tax measured by
gross income. It would seem that a tax on resident individuals and
corporations doing business in the state measured by gross income from
all sources, including salaries, wages, dividends, interest, and rent as
well as business income, should be similarly sustained as an excise tax,
rather than a tax on property in the constitutional sense. If the tax
base includes gross income from sources other than business activities,
however, there may be some doubt. Some statements by the court in a
case involving a city-levied tax may indicate a lack of legislative power
to treat the receipt of salary or other compensation for services ren-
dered as a proper subject of excise taxation.
The federal commerce clause restrictions make a tax measured by
gross income much less desirable than a tax measured by net income
because of the greater restrictions and limitations applicable to the
former. The experience of Indiana with its gross income tax well-
illustrates this. Furthermore, widespread dissatisfaction exists in this
state with respect to the business and occupation tax because of the
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unfairness of the gross income measure. Thus, even though an all-
inclusive tax measured by gross income might be upheld constitution-
ally, it is clear that a proposal to levy such a tax would meet great
opposition from the business community, representatives of which are
urging change in or elimination of the present tax measured by gross
income.
Still another form of tax which is sometimes regarded as a tax on
income is the tax on consumers. A tax on retail sales or a tax on the
use of articles purchased at retail is such a tax. Although a form of
income tax, such taxes are actually taxes on expenditures, or outgo,
rather than on income; unspent income is accordingly excluded from
the tax base, but consumption expenditures out of capital are included
in it. Thus, only if the taxpayer spends all of his income, and no more
than his income, for taxed articles, is this truly an income tax. This
type of tax has met the test of validity under the state constitution and
is in existence in this state. Broadening of the definition of the trans-
actions to which the retail sales tax and the use tax apply is one
alternative open to the legislature. Another alternative is to increase
the rate applicable to the present base of these taxes. In either case,
the legislature is confronted with no obstacle under the state constitu-
tion.
Business taxes. State-levied taxes on persons and other entities
engaging in business activities are permissible and have been sustained
under the various constitutional provisions, federal and state. The
general business and occupation tax, in effect in this state since 1933,
is a prime example, but only one of many examples, of a tax of this
kind. Although some persons and firms doing business in the state are
either partially or wholly exempt from such taxes because of conflict
with the requirements of the commerce clause or the doctrine of inter-
governmental immunities, such taxes encounter no substantial obstacles
under the provisions of the state constitution, because they are excise
taxes and not taxes on property. The legislature has broad power in
its choice of the business activities to be taxed and exempted. There
must be a reasonable basis for the legislative classification, but the
legislative determination is most infrequently upset. The legislature
may vary the rates and tax different classes at different rates. If it
desires, the legislature may impose more than one tax upon persons
engaging in a particular type of business. With one exception, the
legislature has freedom in the choice of the tax base and may, as it has
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in the past, prescribe different tax bases for different classes of tax-
payers.
Other than the requirement of reasonableness of classification, the
only substantial restriction under the state constitution appears to be
that net income cannot be utilized as the base for determining the
amount of tax payable. Whether even this restriction exists is open
to doubt. Although the court has consistently disapproved taxes on,
or measured by, net income heretofore enacted by either the electors
or the legislature, none of the earlier acts using net income as the tax
base has been framed to apply only to persons, firms, and corporations
engaging in business activities in the state. The court has said that such
a tax, when measured by gross values, gross proceeds of sales, or
gross income, is an excise tax and not a tax on property in the constitu-
tional sense. If only the tax base of the business and occupation tax
were changed so that the amount of the tax payable were determined
by reference to net income rather than gross income or other gross
measure, the court might conclude that the tax is still an excige and not
a property tax. Otherwise, it would be forced to say that the utilization
of net income as the tax measure, and that alone, makes a tax a prop-
erty tax. After saying that a tax on business activities measured by
gross-the entire take-is an excise, to say that the same tax is a
property tax if measured by net income would, to say the least, seem
totally to disregard both the economic and practical realities. The
court, however, could simply rely on its statements in Power, Inc. v.
Huntley to classify the tax so measured as a property tax.
There is no certainty that a tax on the business activities of all
individuals and other legal entities measured by net income would have
the judicial sanction which is required for such an act to be operative.
Utilization of net income, rather than gross income, as the tax measure
provides a method of meeting the objections to the gross income meas-
ure which have been so frequently voiced on behalf of businesses
operating on a low profit margin. Utilization of net income, rather than
gross income, as the tax measure would also broaden the tax base by
avoiding those requirements of the federal commerce clause and the
governmental immunities doctrine which are more drastic with respect
to state taxes measured by gross income than with respect to such taxes
measured by net income.
Other excise taxes. Taxes on the performance of a variety of acts,
other than engaging in business, are likewise excise taxes, rather than
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property taxes, in the constitutional sense. The power of the legislature
to select the activity to be taxed and to prescribe the amount of tax
payable is the same as it is in the case of excise taxes on business
activities. The legislature has a very broad discretion, and its policy
determinations are most infrequently upset by the courts. Illustrative
of taxes in this category are the retail sales tax, the general use tax,
the tax on use of motor vehicles, the tax on sale, use or distribution of
motor vehicle fuel, and the tax on sale of cigarettes. Also included are
transfer taxes, such as the inheritance tax, the gift tax, and the tax on
conveyance of real estate. The federal commerce and due process
clauses operate to free some transactions from state taxes of this type,
as does the governmental immunities doctrine. In addition to reducing
the state tax base, these provisions create competitive inequalities
between, and hardships on, distributors of taxed commodities and
services. They also produce difficulties in effective administration of
some of these taxes. But, from the standpoint of the state constitution,
the legislature may select virtually any activity or transaction as the
object of a state tax. If there is a reasonable basis for the legislative
selection, the tax base, with one exception, is solely for legislative
determination. The rate of the tax is, likewise, solely a matter of
legislative policy. The exception mentioned above is that the state
court has always held invalid any tax of this type which employed net
income as the tax base. But, aside from this judicially evolved restric-
tion, the legislature is not hampered by any substantial state constitu-
tional restrictions upon its choice of the object, the base, or the rate of
such taxes. The economic and social factors, including the weighing
of the tax burden imposed by this state, in comparison with that of
states which are competitive with Washington, are the most significant
elements with which the legislature must deal in this area.
Poll tax. Although the capitation tax, often called a poll tax or
head tax, is generally in very low repute in this country, it should be
noted that there is no constitutional barrier to such a tax by the state.
Such a tax, in operation for only a short period of time, has been
upheld as an excise tax and not a property tax in the constitutional
sense.
The legislature, consequently, has the same breadth of discretion to
classify the persons subject to the tax and to determine the rate, or
rates, of tax upon different classes, if any, as it has in the case of
business and other excise taxes.
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Municipal taxes. The power of the various subdivisions of the
state to levy taxes for local purposes depends upon express legislative
grant of authority to tax. The legislature may grant the taxing power,
or it may withhold it. It may grant the taxing power subject to con-
ditions which it prescribes. It may grant the power to levy a tax to
one or more, but not all, types of municipal subdivisions. With respect
to taxes on property, the constitutional restrictions, as well as the
judicial interpretations of the constitutional provisions, are appendant
to the grant of power to levy such taxes. Whenever the legislature
grants to the local subdivisions the power to levy taxes, that power is
subject to the constitutional requirement that the taxes so levied shall
be uniform with respect to the person or property in the jurisdiction
which levies the tax. This requires geographic uniformity, but allows
a wide latitude with respect to selection of the object, the tax base, and
the tax rate. Presumably this discretion is as broad, and subject to the
same limiting factors, as is the power of the legislature to levy the same
tax for state purposes. The extent to which the legislature grants the
taxing power for local purposes to the local subdivisions is, conse-
quently, dependent far more upon consideration of a wide variety of
non-legal factors than it is upon existing constitutional restrictions
upon legislative power.
CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS ON FiscAL ORGANIZATION
First, what is the scope within which action is constitutionally pos-
sible for strengthening the effectiveness of governmental services?
This question can be considered by examining three major areas: the
allocation of services among jurisdictional levels, the organizational
patterns used for administration, and the possibilities for employing
reliable managerial methods.
In allocating services, the important consideration is to obtain
balance among the need for service, the capacity to determine policy,
the capacity to administer, and the availability of fiscal support. Under
present circumstances in the state of Washington, the allocation is
likely to be primarily influenced by the availability of financial sup-
port. Whatever the other criteria, services tend to settle within legal
reach of means for supporting them. Other and equally important
elements are not marked by the same degree of constitutional rigidity.
Hence they are treated as less significant, a tendency that contributes
to another set of maladjustments. Amendment seventeen, in particular,
introduces constitutional inflexibility that skews the application of all
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criteria for the distribution of service responsibilities among service
levels.
It would seem that article VII and article XI, section 12, contem-
plate that state services shall be supported by state-imposed revenues,
and local services by locally-imposed revenues. This theory would be
reasonably workable with some accommodation for the intermediate
situations of mixed state-local services, and it would not be inconsistent
with criteria of sound administration, if the authority of local jurisdic-
tions to provide local support could be geared to the realities of the
present day scope of local services. But this cannot be done. The
fiscal capacity of the local level is harnessed to the operation of the
"forty-mill limit" and the practical possibilities for sharing excises
with the state and for imposing local service charges. The portion
of the local service load that cannot be financed in this fashion inevit-
ably falls back upon the state revenue system, where it competes for
support with services that are inherently state-wide in nature. As a
result, Washington raises approximately seventy per cent of the total
of all of its state and local taxes at the state level; after redistribution
through grants and sharings, the proportion remaining for the support
of state services is only forty per cent. To put the point the other
way around, local units raise thirty per cent of the total taxes but
utilize sixty per cent for the support of the services they administer.
The broader criteria of policy responsibility and administrative
capacity have given way. Property tax limitation seriously impairs
the legislature's capacity to allocate service responsibilities in ways
that make for effective and responsible government. Also involved,
of course, are other constitutional provisions, particularly article VII,
section 6, and article XI, section 12, but these would seem to be minor
difficulties were it not for the effect of amendment seventeen.
With respect to organization, the controlling consideration is the
capacity of the legislature to establish forms of structure that will
reinforce, rather than defeat, the development of operating cohesion
and the use of well-understood methods for effective management.
There is much about the present constitutional structure that en-
trenches and legitimatizes ineffectiveness. It is self-evident that until
the "long ballot" of the state government is substantially shortened,
the governor as the operating executive of state administration will
be unable to develop operating unity and coordination. This means
a comprehensive change of article three. Specifications are not neces-
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sary here; the objectives are clear-cut. In county government another
set of needs has emerged. The role of county government is changing.
In many parts of the state it has changed. The traditional administra-
tive role of the county is outgrown. The time is approaching when
boundaries will need readjustment to fit new patterns of local service
areas. The area with which county government deals in much of
the state is no longer essentially rural, with families meeting the pre-
dominant share of their service needs through a self-sufficient farm
establishment. Rural population is clustering in rural neighborhoods,
clusters that are too small for full incorporation but still need one
or another degree of essentially urban services. Some service needs,
indeed, such as fire protection, fan out over large areas containing
a variety of small neighborhoods. From this condition has sprung
the present tangle of special and junior taxing districts, the incon-
venient step-children of the tax limitation system. It seems essential
that a redesigned form of county government be equipped to provide
competently administered services of assured quality and effectiveness,
probably on a contractual basis, to the residents of these exurban
neighborhoods. The home rule provisions of amendment twenty-one
are not enough. Article eleven needs a comprehensive revision.
Second, is the matter of the sound and effective utilization of the
fiscal resources of the state. The state government today is an opera-
tion with net transactions of over a billion dollars a year. Only about
a third of this total is reflected in what is generally regarded as the
state budget. A full quarter is not even included in the central finan-
cial records of the state government or brought under regular legis-
lative and executive scrutiny. A troublesome state "deficit" appears
in a general account, disappears in a general fund, and is absorbed
without a trace in the over-all condition of the treasury. This is
scarcely a context within which administrative management can be
expected to function, or responsibility for the affairs of the state be
enforced. From the constitutional standpoint, the difficutly is rooted
in the interpretation of article VIII, section 4, and to a lesser extent in
article VII, section 6. In view of the judicial decisions construing
these provisions, particularly the former, it is difficult to identify, short
of constitutional revision, any sound course of action toward a modern
and thoroughly efficient system of fiscal administration.
This survey has aimed at identifying and evaluating the constitu-
tional boundaries within which the state of Washington must approach
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its fiscal problems, present and future. The conclusion is inescapable
that the state and its communities are gravely constricted by a constitu-
tional framework designed for a wholly different set of needs and
circumstances. The future calls for new and vital approaches. Imag-
ination, resourcefulness and innovation, now denied to the legislature,
must be exercised in the years ahead. Difficult as present circum-
stances are, it must be remembered that they do not reflect a static
condition. The state is in midstream of long-range development,
moving, it appears, at an accelerating pace. To live in this future with'
statesmanship and civic wisdom, the state needs a fresh beginning in
its basic law.
